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1 Introduction
Many scientists believe that global climate change represents the most pervasive externality
of our time (Stern, 2006). Perhaps one of the lowest-hanging fruits in combating climate
change is to design firm-level incentive schemes for workers to engage in green behaviors.
We are not aware of any studies that have explored incentive aspects within the workplace
that pertain to sustainability, whether it is shifting work hours to less energy-intensive times
of the day or incenting employees to use fewer resources per unit of output. Given the
Environmental Protection Agency estimate that 21 percent of carbon emissions in the United
States are from firms (U.S. Enviromental Protection Agency, 2015), there is undoubtedly
much to gain. Indeed, when resource use is linked to production costs (as is almost always
the case), mitigating the externality has the potential to foster increased profits, providing
distinct possibilities of a win-win scenario.
Consider the transportation sector, and in particular air transportation of humans and
cargo. The airline industry is a significant contributor to human welfare, with over three
billion passengers per year and 35% of the value of world trade transported by air (Federal
Aviation Administration, 2015). However, the global aviation industry is directly responsi-
ble for significant health costs among vulnerable population groups (Schlenker and Walker,
2015).1 Moreover, excessive fuel use in the industry affects profits—fuel represents an aver-
age 33% of operating costs (Air Transport Action Group, 2014)—and poses a severe risk to
the global environment. Emissions from the air transport sector currently account for 3.5-5%
of global radiative forcing and 2-3% of global carbon dioxide emissions (Penner et al., 1999;
Lee et al., 2009; Burkhardt and Kärcher, 2011), deeming the industry a significant force in
climate change discussions.2 Technology adoption and market-based instruments continue to
appear on the industry’s agenda as primary means to reach its dual goals of carbon neutral
growth by 2020 and halving greenhouse gas emissions from 2005 levels by 2050 (see Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization, 2013). Yet, despite large potential to reduce fuel burn
from eliminating operational inefficiencies (Green, 2009; Singh and Sharma, 2015), almost
1Schlenker and Walker (2015) focus on the effects of network delays in the east coast of the United States
on congestion at large airports in California to assess health effects from daily variation in air pollution.
These effects are presumed to be generalizable across large airports globally and are a consequence of the
aviation industry as a whole.
2Past research has shown that the airline industry has also not fully internalized social costs associated
with crashes (Borenstein and Zimmerman, 1988). Here we highlight yet another means by which the social
cost of the industry is not incorporated into its decision calculus. Nonetheless, demand for air travel is
forecasted to increase over the next two decades and, as a result, airline emissions will likely trend upwards
(Borenstein, 2011).
1
no research has been undertaken to understand the potential for cost and emissions savings
from changes in the behavior of transport personnel. In fact, we do not know of any research,
more generally, on the optimal incentive structure for employees to engage in conservation
activities in the workplace.
Our study takes a strong initial step toward such an understanding by partnering with
Virgin Atlantic Airways (VAA) on a field experiment. We observe over 40,000 unique flights
over a 27-month period for the entire population of captains eligible to fly both before and
during the experiment.3 In the aviation industry, airline captains maintain a considerable
amount of autonomy when it comes to fuel and flight decisions.4 We capitalize on recent
technological developments that capture detailed flight-level data to measure captains’ fuel
efficiency across three distinct phases—pre-flight, in-flight, and post-flight.5 Our pre-flight
measure (denoted Fuel Load) assesses the accuracy with which captains implement final
adjustments to aircraft fuel load given all relevant factors (e.g., weather and aircraft weight).
Our in-flight measure (denoted Efficient Flight) assesses how fuel-efficiently the captain
operates the aircraft between takeoff and landing. Our post-flight measure (denoted Efficient
Taxi) provides information on how fuel-efficiently the captain operates the aircraft once on
the ground.
Our experiment explores the extent to which several experimental treatments—implemen-
ted from February 2014 through September 2014—influence captains’ behaviors. The treat-
ments are inspired by a simple principal-agent model wherein we attempt to influence the
behaviors of VAA captains. Our theoretical model yields predictions on how the act of
measurement itself might yield behavioral change, in the spirit of the Hawthorne effects
3The “captain”—as opposed to the “first officer”—is the pilot on the aircraft who makes command
decisions and is ultimately responsible for the flight’s safety. As a rule, captains are the most senior pilots in
an airline (see Smith (2013) for insight into captains’ roles and responsibilities). In the cockpit of a typical
flight from New York to London, there would be one captain and one first officer on board who both engage
(more or less equally) in aircraft operations, though the captain is ultimately responsible for all aspects of
flight operation. A vast majority of airline captains survive rigorous job market competition to secure their
jobs, investing thousands of hours of training (privately or elsewhere) before obtaining the opportunity to
be considered for a flying career with a major airline. A handful of VAA captains who were on leave for
personal reasons or were fulfilling duties outside of their usual obligations were excluded from the sample.
4There has been prior research on understanding the decision making of airline captains under risk,
especially through weather conditions (see Gilbey and Hill, 2012; Hunter, 2002; Madhavan and Lacson,
2006; Walmsley and Gilbey, 2016; Wiggins et al., 2012).
5The Fuel Efficiency team within Virgin Atlantic Airways was responsible for identification of the fuel-
efficient behaviors targeted in this study, which represent the outcomes of just a few of the many decisions
that a captain engages with during a given flight.
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described in Levitt and List (2011).6 In addition, the model shows how performance infor-
mation, personal targets, and prosocial incentives for reaching those targets can motivate
behavioral change. As such, our experimental design revolves around understanding how
the act of measurement and each of these three factors—information about recent fuel effi-
ciency, information including target fuel usage, and prosocial incentives (a donation to the
captain’s chosen charity conditional on achieving the target efficiency)—affect captains’ be-
haviors from pre-flight to post-flight. We are unaware of any previous research that tests
the impacts of targets or prosocial incentives on worker productivity in such a high-stakes
professional setting.
Making use of more than 110,000 observations of behavior across 335 captains, we find
several interesting insights that have the potential to alter conventional approaches to mo-
tivate employee effort in the workplace and to both efficiently reduce operating costs and
environmental waste. Perhaps most surprisingly, by simply informing the captains that we—
i.e. the academic researchers and VAA Fuel Efficiency personnel overseeing the study—are
measuring their behaviors on three dimensions, we are able to considerably reduce fuel ineffi-
ciency.7 For example, captains significantly increased the implementation of Efficient Flight
and Efficient Taxi by nearly 50 percent from the pre-experimental period. These behav-
ioral changes generated more than 6.8 million kilograms of fuel saved for the airline over
the eight-month experimental period (i.e. $5.37 million in fuel savings), which translated to
6Captains were assured on several occasions that their participation in the experiment held no implications
or consequences for their salaries or career prospects. For instance, the initial letter sent to all (treatment
and control) captains in January 2014 included the following statements (emphasis included): “This is
not, in any way, shape or form, an attempt to set up a ‘fuel league table’, or any attempt at
moving in the direction of a fuel league table. It is an independent research project to see whether
information provided in different ways affects individual decisions. All data gathered during this study will
remain anonymous and confidential... Again, we would like to stress that Captains’ anonymity will be
maintained throughout the study; whilst somebody in Flight Ops Admin has to correlate which Captain gets
which letter, Flight Operations Management will have no visibility of which Captain is in which Group, and
who is doing what in response to which information. Information will be sent to all Captains in the active
study groups. What you choose to do with that information is entirely up to you.”
7This pure monitoring effect aligns with agency theory (e.g., Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Stiglitz, 1975),
as well as with experimental results such as those in Boly (2011). These results are also related to the work
of Hubbard (2000, 2003), who found that monitoring truckers’ performance using GPS technology leads to
improved performance for those workers where driver effort is important and where verifying drivers’ actions
to insurers is valuable. He estimates that such technology has increased capacity utilization by around 3%
in the trucking industry. Company policies precluded the designation of an uninformed control group, so
estimates of Hawthorne effects are based on before-and-after comparisons, as in Bandiera et al. (2007, 2009).
Nonetheless, our results suggest that the data before the experiment was stationary and there was an upward
trend once the experiment started (adjusting for seasonality). Importantly, since all information provided
to captains in treatment groups is individual-specific, we are able to rule out contamination (i.e. spillover
effects of information) as a possible contributor to the change in behavior exhibited by the control group.
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more than 21 million kg of CO2 abated.
Despite these large Hawthorne effects, we find a significant role for our three experimen-
tal treatments. Our information treatment increases effort for Efficient Taxi, but does not
increase effort for Fuel Load or Efficient Flight. We find, however, that personal targets
increase effort for Efficient Flight and Efficient Taxi. Finally, prosocial incentives increase
effort across all three dimensions. Furthermore, we find significant differences between infor-
mation and the two other treatments while we do not detect differential effects between the
target and prosocial treatment groups. That is, adding conditional prosocial incentives in
the form of a donation to the captain’s chosen charity does not provide further lift beyond
the effects of a personal target.8 Yet, there is an interesting effect of prosocial incentives:
they induce a reduction in flying time by an average of 1 minute and 30 seconds per flight
relative to the control group, equivalent to more than 80 hours of reduced flight time over
the eight-month course of the study.9
Our difference-in-difference treatment effect estimates indicate that the various inter-
ventions increased implementation of fuel-efficient activities by 1-10 percent above the pre-
experimental period (i.e. in addition to the Hawthorne effect).10 Based on these effects, we
estimate that our three treatments saved between 266,000-704,000 kg ($209,000-$553,000) of
fuel for the airline over the eight-month experimental period. This fuel savings corresponds
to 838,000-2,220,000 kg of CO2 abated. Since the cost of the treatments is merely the cost
of postage materials (here, $855 per treatment group), the marginal abatement cost (MAC)
of the treatments is minuscule, falling between $1.02 and $0.39 per ton of carbon saved.
However, since the airline benefited from significant cost savings via reduced fuel usage as a
result of our interventions, the MAC in this context is -$250 per ton in actuality. Such an
astonishingly low MAC outperforms every other reported carbon abatement technology of
which we are aware (see Enkvist and Rosander, 2007; McKinsey, 2009).11
Our experimental design highlights the usefulness of moving beyond short-run effects in
8We believe that we are the first to experimentally estimate the impact of an incentive given to a charity
if the worker reaches a certain performance target in his or her job. Our notion of prosocial incentives is
therefore different to the social incentives presented in Bandiera et al. (2009, 2010).
9These results are based on all flights and are presented in Table A7. The total is obtained by multiplying
the average effect of captains in the prosocial treatment group relative to control by the number of flights
undertaken in the prosocial treatment group during the study period.
10Since there were no upward trends before the experiment began—that is, a Dickey-Fuller test indicates
that pre-treatment behaviors were stationary—we can be certain that our experiment improved fuel efficiency
from business as usual.
11The most cost-effective abatement strategy according to McKinsey (2009) is switching residential lighting
from incandescent bulbs to LED bulbs at a MAC of approximately -165 Euro, or about -$177.
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favor of understanding long-term embedded behavior change. First, in terms of persistence
of the treatment effects throughout the experiment, we find that the largest effects for Fuel
Load and Efficient Flight arise in the middle months of the experiment, while the treat-
ment effect for Efficient Taxi is consistently high throughout the experiment. Interestingly,
across all three treatments, we find the largest effects for the behavior that is the easiest to
change (Efficient Taxi). Once the experiment finishes, however, we find that captains’ effort
reverts to post-experiment baseline levels (i.e. equivalent attainment to the control group
once the experiment terminates) for Fuel Load and Efficient Flight, though the treatment
effects remain for Efficient Taxi. With regards to the persistence of the Hawthorne effect, the
post-experiment baseline remains considerably improved from the pre-experiment baseline,
perhaps indicating that monitoring induces captains to make low-effort efficiency improve-
ments that are quickly and easily habituated. A different interpretation to the Hawthorne
effect could be that the Captains now learn that the firm values fuel efficiency (which the
Captains probably also believe is a good thing). This relates to the work by Bloom and
Van Reenen (2007) and Bloom et al. (2014) on the impact of ‘soft’ management styles and
structures on worker productivity.
Finally, our design allows us to demonstrate welfare benefits pertaining to the employees.
We find that captains’ job satisfaction is positively influenced by prosocial incentives and
job performance. Captains in the prosocial treatment group report a job satisfaction rating
6.5% higher than captains in the control group. Moreover, for every additional personal
target met by captains receiving targets or prosocial incentives (out of 24 opportunities in
total), job satisfaction increases by 1%, on average. Based on this result, we therefore not
only encourage airlines to provide captains with performance-based targets to improve fuel
efficiency, but also urge them to discover means by which to support captains in reaching
said targets in order to improve their well-being.12
Our findings are important for academics, businesses, and policymakers alike. For aca-
demics, the theory and experimental results hold implications for environmental, behavioral,
labor, and public economics. For example, there exist movements within both applied eco-
nomics (“X-efficiency”; see Leibenstein, 1966) and environmental economics (the “Porter
Hypothesis”; see Porter and van der Linde, 1995) arguing that substantial “free gains” exist
within firms. The premise is a behavioral one: rather than modeling firms as fully aware and
understanding of all extant means to maximize resource efficiency—thereby exhausting all
12While we are dubious of using subjective assessments of well-being as precise measurements of welfare,
we measured job satisfaction in our survey since it is a metric commonly used in the airline and other
industries to assess the well-being of employees.
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cost-efficient measures at each moment in time—this approach considers the firm as a compo-
sition of networks of boundedly rational individuals burdened by problematic principal-agent
incentive conflicts (Leibenstein, 1966; Perelman, 2011). To support this view, a survey of
evidence argues that a typical firm operates at 65% to 97% efficiency (Button and Weyman-
Jones, 1992), though much of this evidence is based on observational data and does not
assess impacts based on a true counterfactual. Our work complements this environmental
and behavioral research by moving in a hitherto unconsidered direction: rather than focus
on capital improvements or research and development, we explore efficiency effects of in-
centing labor directly during their normal course of work. For labor economists considering
principal-agent settings, our study suggests that allowing the agent flexibility to achieve
goals might be a key trigger in enhancing effort profiles.13
For businesses and policymakers, we present a novel and promising approach to combat-
ing firm-level externalities: design appropriate incentives for workers. More narrowly, the
study provides practical and cost-effective fuel solutions for the air transport industry. Our
empirical approach lends itself naturally to related tests across other sectors of the economy.
By making use of our theoretical framework to guide experimental treatments in the field,
businesses and policymakers can learn not only what works, but also why it works. This
understanding will provide decision-makers with a more effective toolkit to advance efficient
policies and procedures.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background,
a sketch of the theory, and the experimental design. Section 3 presents the experimental
results. Section 4 provides a discussion related to policy implications and related avenues
for future research.
2 Background, Theory, and Experimental Design
A few years ago we began discussions with VAA to partner on a field experiment with
the aim of understanding behavioral components of fuel usage without adversely affecting
13This leads to another unique feature of the study which is that we are not in a typical principal-agent
problem in which the principal does not observe effort. Here, the principal has very good measures of
effort. Instead, the principal has contractual restrictions (from the union) against contracting on effort (or
on output), which is the typical contracting variable in a basic principal-agent model. Instead, the firm is
in a “second-best” world of needing to use behavioral incentives instead of financial incentives.
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safety practices or job satisfaction.14 We developed a theoretical framework and a field
experiment (detailed further below) that allow us to remain within institutional constraints
while maintaining the integrity of lending theoretical insights to the experimental data. We
were permitted to provide monthly tailored feedback to 335 airline captains—the entire
eligible captain population of VAA—from February 2014-September 2014. Importantly, all
eligible VAA captains were included in the experiment—in either control or treatment. VAA
captains have absolute authority to make all fuel decisions. They range in experience and fly
long-haul flights on various aircraft types (Airbus 330-300, Airbus 340-300, Airbus 340-600,
Boeing 744-400, Boeing 787-9). We include a map of destinations in Figure 1.15
While many of the captains’ choices are important in terms of fuel efficiency outcomes,
VAA identified three primary measurable levers to change behavior for the purpose of this
study. The first lever is a pre-flight consideration, which VAA denotes as Zero Fuel Weight
(ZFW) adjustment. Approximately 90 minutes before each flight, captains utilize flight-
specific flight plan information (e.g., expected fuel usage, weather, and aircraft weight) in
conjunction with their own professional judgment to determine initial fuel uptake, which
usually corresponds to approximately 90% of the anticipated fuel necessary for the flight.
This amount is fueled into the aircraft simultaneous to the loading of passengers and cargo.
Near to completion of passenger boarding and cargo/baggage loading, the pilots—now on
the flight deck—receive updated information regarding the final weight of the aircraft and
may adjust the fuel on the aircraft accordingly. The information they receive from Flight
Operations includes a ZFW measure, which indicates the weight of the aircraft with the
revenue load (i.e. passengers and cargo), as well as the Takeoff Weight (TOW), which
includes both revenue load and fuel.
Captains then perform a ZFW calculation in which they first calculate the amount by
which they should increase or decrease fuel load based on the final ZFW—a formula that
is standard across the airline industry. If they have chosen to increase the fuel load, they
subsequently compute a second iteration to account for the additional fuel necessary to carry
the fuel that they have chosen to add to the aircraft. If the amount of fuel already on the
aircraft is sufficient according to these calculations, the captain may choose not to add any
additional fuel.
14The study is a component of Change is in the Air, VAA’s wider sustainabil-
ity initiative focused primarily on fuel and carbon reduction (see http://www.virgin-
atlantic.com/content/dam/VAA/Documents/sustainabilitypdf/SustainabilityPolicy201407.05.14.pd).
15All operations to Aberdeen and Edinburgh are VAA Little Red operations (i.e. branded VAA flights
operated by a third party) and were excluded from the analysis. In April 2015, VAA removed its service to
Cape Town; this route change took place subsequent to the period covered in our dataset.
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For mnemonic purposes, rather than use ZFW we denote this binary outcome variable
as Fuel Load. Fuel Load indicates whether this double iteration has been performed and the
fuel level adjusted accordingly. We deem the captains’ behavior as successful if their final
fuel load is within 200 kg of the “correct” amount of fuel as dictated by the calculation. This
allowance prevents penalizing captains for rounding and slight over- or under-fuelling on the
part of the fueller while providing measurable targets for captains in two of our treatment
groups.16 According to our partner airline, accurate Fuel Load adjustment should ideally
be performed on every flight regardless of circumstances, which would correspond to 100%
attainment for the performance metric provided.
The second lever is an in-flight consideration: Efficient Flight. The Efficient Flight metric
captures whether captains (and their co-pilots) use less fuel during flight than is allotted in
the updated flight plan.17 We use this metric to understand whether captains have made
fuel-efficient choices between takeoff and landing. This measure incorporates several in-flight
behaviors that augment fuel efficiency, such as requesting and executing optimal altitudes
and shortcuts from air traffic control, maintaining ideal speeds, optimally adjusting to en
route weather updates, and ensuring efficient aerodynamic arrangements with respect to
flap settings as well as takeoff and landing gear. We decided on Efficient Flight to measure
in-flight efficiency since it is the only measure considered that affords captains the flexibility
to achieve the target while using professional judgment to ensure that safety remains the
first priority. Under some uncommon circumstances, operational requirements dictate that
captains sacrifice fuel efficiency (and VAA accepts the captains’ decisions as final), so we
would not expect even a “model” captain to perform this metric on 100% of flights, though
the metric should be attainable on a vast majority of flights. In our analysis, Efficient Flight
equals 1 if the captain does not exceed the projected fuel use for that flight (adjusted for
actual TOW), and 0 otherwise.18
VAA’s final lever—reduced-engine taxi-in (Efficient Taxi or Efficient Taxiing, hereafter)—
16Sustainable Aviation (2012, hereafter “SA”) estimates that more accurate fuel-loading can save approx-
imately 0.5% of total fuel burn; with average fuel consumption per flight of 69,500 kg, the corresponding
fuel savings is approximately 350 kg fuel per flight. SA is an alliance of UK airlines, airports, aerospace
manufacturers, and air navigation service providers with the long-term objective of reducing air and noise
pollution. Using data from its 2014 sectors, our partner airline estimated an average fuel savings of 250
kg per sector for correct Fuel Load calculations. Ryerson et al. (2015) attempt to estimate the excess fuel
burned for an anonymous airline by too much fuel being loaded onto the plane.
17The flight plan is updated subsequent to decisions made on Fuel Load so that decisions regarding the
first metric do not affect one’s ability to meet this in-flight metric.
18We created binary variables for Fuel Load and Efficient Flight so we could assign targets to captains in
the targets and prosocial incentives group.
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occurs post-flight. Once the aircraft has landed and the engines have cooled, captains may
choose to shut down one (or two, in a four-engine aircraft) of their engines while they
taxi to the gate, thereby decreasing fuel burn per minute spent taxiing. Captains meet
the criteria for this metric if they shut down (at least) one engine during taxi in.19 As
with Efficient Flight, there are circumstances under which the airline would not expect or
prescribe the implementation of Efficient Taxi. Obstacles include geographical constraints
(e.g., the placement or layout of the runway) and the complexity of the taxi route (e.g.,
number of stops, turns, or cul-de-sacs). Still, the metric should also be attainable on a vast
majority of flights, and obstacles to implementation are uncorrelated with treatment.
Fuel Load, Efficient Flight, and Efficient Taxi are the three primary outcome variables in
our experiment. It is important to recognize that fuel is a major cost to airlines—accounting
for roughly 33 percent20 of total operating costs—and has been rising over the last fifteen
years (Borenstein, 2011; International Air Transport Association, 2014). For this reason
airlines are interested in cost-effective means to reduce fuel burn per flight. Given their
renowned expertise and experience in the industry, however, airline captains are granted sig-
nificant autonomy in their decision-making across several fuel-relevant behaviors, including
those described above. Moreover, airline captains are unionized so it is contractually difficult
to use performance-related pay to motivate fuel efficiency.21 As such, we focus on airline
captains’ behavioral adjustments to reduce fuel usage.
Theoretical Sketch of Captains’ Behavior
We model an airline captain’s choices using a static game of a principal-agent model that
determines a captain’s chosen effort in a given period (for parsimony, we briefly sketch the
model here and provide details in Appendix II). The tasks consist of the aforementioned pre-
flight to post-flight fuel usage metrics. Captains observe their own effort and a signal of fuel
usage; the signal is noisy unless the captain receives information. Captain’s perspectives on
fuel usage and their fuel-relevant decisions are rooted in their own experiences and preferences
and are conditional on contextual (i.e. flight- and day-specific) factors.
19SA estimates that this practice—in conjunction with reduction in auxiliary power use substitution—
prevents the emissions of 100,000 metric tons of CO2 annually. Fuel savings from Efficient Taxi depend on
scheduling and delays as savings are accrued on a per-minute basis. Fuel savings also depend on aircraft
type and only begin to accrue after engines have cooled, which takes 2-5 minutes from touch down. Savings
per minute for aircraft operated within our study are as follows: 12.5 kg (B744, A330), 8.75 kg (A346), and
6.25 kg (A343).
20For the airline represented in this study, fuel accounts for 35% of operating costs.
21For a discussion of how unionization can affect the long-run outcomes of firms, see Lee and Mas (2012).
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Captains choose how much effort to exert to maximize a utility function that includes
utility from wealth, job performance, and charitable giving, as well as disutility from effort
exertion and social pressure. The model has the standard prediction from the first order
conditions that the captain will expand effort until its marginal cost equals the marginal
utility gained from the associated decrease in fuel usage. This prediction occurs on several
dimensions, such as utility from job performance, utility from giving to a charity, as well as
disutility from social pressure (a la DellaVigna et al. (2012)).
Although our base model follows DellaVigna et al. (2012), we extend the model to in-
corporate a reference-dependent component to capture the effects of exogenous targets. In
line with existing theories of reference dependence, we posit that a change in one’s per-
sonal expectations from the status quo to an improved outcome can boost performance and,
consequently, utility. We therefore introduce feedback to employees providing non-binding
targets—i.e. focal points for attainment of the three fuel-relevant behaviors—that encapsu-
late reference-dependent preferences.22 We expect utility from job satisfaction to increase
for those who meet their targets. As in the Köszegi and Rabin (2006) model of reference-
dependent preferences, we assume individuals are loss averse and, as such, performing below
the target level will cause more disutility than exceeding the target level will benefit the
individual.
The notion that prosocial incentives can motivate behavior change is rooted in theories
of pure and impure altruism (Becker, 1974; Andreoni, 1989, 1990). Pure altruism requires
that individuals derive utility from the benefits they directly receive from the provision of
a public good. Impure altruism posits that individuals gain utility from the act of giving
itself, so that an individual whose altruism is completely impure will provide the same dollar
value toward the public good regardless of the provision of others. Both pure and impure
altruism provide positive utility to (altruistic) economic agents, and we assume that indi-
viduals are characterized by some combination of the two (we do not attempt to distinguish
22There is a rich psychology literature on goal setting. Heath et al. (1999) present evidence that goals act
as reference points inducing loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity in a manner consistent with Prospect
Theory. Additionally, Locke and Latham (2006, p. 265) argue that psychology studies show that “specific,
high (hard) goals lead to a higher level of task performance than do easy goals or vague, abstract goals such as
the exhortation to ‘do one’s best.”’ According to this line of research, there are four factors that determine the
effectiveness of the target, namely feedback (which people need in order to track their progress); commitment
to the goal (which is enhanced by self-efficacy and viewing the goal as important); task complexity (to the
extent that task knowledge is harder to acquire on complex tasks); and situational constraints. Clearly,
within our experiment, we provide feedback on a monthly basis, though the experiment is characterized
by individual-level differences in task complexity, absence of prior commitments, and a very high-stakes
context. Psychology studies do not exist that address the complex and high-stake field environment in which
our experiment takes place.
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between them in our experiment). This characterization provides a prediction that altruistic
motivations combined with charitable incentives will augment fuel efficiency.
In equilibrium, captains choose the corresponding effort level that satisfies the first order
conditions. These choices lead to several propositions.23 First, if social pressure is important,
then captains in the control group will improve their fuel efficiency due to the enhanced
scrutiny of their fuel usage. Second, providing information to captains will cause them to
increase (weakly decrease) their effort if estimated fuel usage is lower (higher) than their
actual fuel usage. The intuition is that the relationship between captains’ estimated fuel
usage and their actual fuel usage importantly determines their utility from job satisfaction.
For example, informing captains that they are fuel inefficient will induce captains to exert
greater effort if they derive disutility from consuming more fuel than their estimated usage.
Alternatively, if their fuel usage is deemed lower than their estimated usage, they might
exert less effort since effort is costly.
Third, targets set above pre-study fuel use will cause captains to weakly increase their
effort.24 Captains will increase their effort if the marginal gain from the associated decrease
in fuel usage due to the target is greater than the marginal cost of effort. Alternatively,
captains will not increase their effort if the marginal cost of effort is larger than the marginal
gain from the associated decrease in fuel usage in the job satisfaction parameter. Fourth,
conditional donations to charity will increase effort if captains’ altruism is strictly positive
and will not affect their effort otherwise. Fifth, of the three dimensions to lower fuel usage—
pre-flight, in-flight, and post-flight—captains will choose to increase their effort the most in
tasks for which the targets are least costly to meet (i.e. Efficient Taxi).
In light of these predictions, we design a field experiment to measure how behaviors re-
lated to fuel usage are affected by: i) information about recent fuel efficiency, ii) information
about target fuel efficiency, and iii) a donation to a chosen charity conditional on achiev-
ing the target efficiency. To our knowledge, we are the first to perform a large-scale field
experiment on firm employees in a real-world extremely high-stakes labor setting (where
23These propositions would be the same if we set up the model in the vein of a multi-tasking model.
24All targets were set by the firm to improve on the pre-study outcomes, so this is the only case we
consider.
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the average salary of a captain is roughly $175,000-$225,00025).26 In doing so, we overcome
prominent labor market frictions in the airline industry by implementing interventions that
do not change contracts of the captains.27 We outline the field experimental design below.
Experimental Design
In accordance with our theoretical model, our field experiment focuses on three main
behavioral motivations for optimizing fuel use: impacts of personalized information, perfor-
mance targets, and prosocial incentives. The three treatments targeted three main behaviors
relevant to fuel use: Fuel Load, Efficient Flight, and Efficient Taxi. Respectively, these three
behaviors allow us to capture captains’ behavior before takeoff, during the flight, and after
landing. Airline captains did not receive detailed information relating their decision-making
to their fuel efficiency prior to this experiment (consistent with both airline and industry
standards). Recent advances in aircraft data collection allow us to obtain precise data to
inform captains of the link between their effort and their efficiency.
25This salary range is based on information updated in June 2015:
http://www.pilotjobsnetwork.com/jobs/Virgin_Atlantic.
26There is a growing literature surrounding field labor economics, but most experiments have focused on
simple tasks (List and Rasul, 2011; Bandiera et al., 2011; Levitt and Neckermann, 2014). Bandiera et al.
(2007, 2009, 2010), using a before and after design within the same company, demonstrate the effects of
managerial compensation and social connections in the workplace on worker productivity and selection in the
fruit picking industry. Shearer (2004) finds that piece-rate wages improve worker productivity in tree planting
relative to fixed-rate wages; Lazear (1999) finds similar incentive effects of piece-rate wages in an observational
study of automobile glass installers. Field experiments on the impact of retail store-level tournaments on
sales show mixed results (Delfgaauw et al., 2013, 2014, 2015), while a quasi-experiment showed that simply
informing warehouse employees of relative wage standing permanently improved productivity (Blanes i Vidal
and Nossol, 2011). One exception to such task simplicity is Gibbs et al. (2014), who analyze the effects of
a rewards program on innovation at a large Asian technology firm in a field experimental setting. They
find that providing rewards for idea acceptance substantially increases the quality of ideas submitted. In
an envelope-stuffing experiment, Al-Ubaydli et al. (2015) find that quality is actually higher under piece-
rate wages (contrary to predictions from economic theory), speculating a role for beliefs about employers’
ability to monitor. In an artefactual field experiment with bicycle messengers, Burks et al. (2009) find that
performance pay reduces cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma game relative to a flat wage. There has been
some research by Rockoff et al. (2012) that demonstrates that simple information on teacher performance to
employers can improve productivity in schools, increase turnover for teachers with low performance estimates,
and produce small test score improvements. Our study is different to all of these studies since we are the first
to randomize targets and prosocial incentives to increase effort on measurable inputs and outputs within the
same company in a very high-stakes field setting.
27While a standard principal-agent model would prescribe the use of contracted performance-related pay
to align captains’ fuel use incentives with those of the airline, the airline workforce is a different labor market
to most due to the high skill requirements (and often government safety certifications) necessary to enter this
particular labor force. See Borenstein and Rose (2007) for a further discussion of the labor market frictions
of the aviation industry.
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We partnered with VAA’s Sustainability and Fuel Efficiency teams to provide accurate
monthly feedback to three treatment groups over the course of eight months across 335 cap-
tains; a control group did not receive any feedback but was aware that their fuel usage was
being monitored.28 Printed feedback reports with information from the previous month’s
flights were sent to the home addresses of treated, so that captains received their first feed-
back report in mid-March 2014 and their final feedback report in mid-October 2014. Our
three treatments can be summarized as follows:
Treatment Group 1: Information. Each feedback report details the captain’s per-
formance of the three fuel-relevant behaviors for the prior month. Specifically, the feedback
presents the percentage of flights flown during the preceding month for which the captain
successfully implemented each of the three behaviors. For instance, if a captain flew four
flights in the prior month, successfully performing Fuel Load and Efficient Taxi on two of
the flights and Efficient Flight on three of the flights, his feedback report would indicate a
50% attainment level for the former behaviors and a 75% attainment level for the latter.
Treatment Group 2: Targets. Captains in this treatment group received the same
information outlined above but were additionally encouraged to achieve personalized targets
of 25% above their pre-experimental baseline attainment levels for each metric (capped at
90%). The targets were communicated to these captains prior to the start of the experiment.
An additional box is included in the feedback report to provide a summary of performance
(i.e. total number of targets met). If at least two of the three targets were met, captains
were recognized with an injunctive statement (“Well Done!”) and encouraged to continue
to fly efficiently the following month. If fewer than two targets were met, captains were
encouraged to fly more efficiently to reach their targets. Captains were not rewarded or
recognized in any public or material fashion for their achievements.
Treatment Group 3: Prosocial Incentives. In addition to the information and
targets provided to captains in treatment group 2, those in the prosocial treatment group
28In keeping with VAA’s culture of transparency, carefully crafted study information sheets were posted
to captains’ home addresses on January 20, 2014. These information sheets guaranteed captains of the
anonymity of their data and assured them that the study was not a step in the direction of competitive
league tables. Additionally, captains in treatment groups received a notification of their assigned treatment
group with a sample feedback form, including the appropriate targets for captains in Treatment Groups 2 and
3, which were posted on January 27, 2014, five days prior to the first day of monitoring. Since participants
were aware that they were part of an experiment, our field experiment should be considered a framed field
experiment in the parlance of Harrison and List (2004). Yet, unlike any other framed field experiment of
which we are aware, we are estimating a parameter devoid of selection since all captains are experimental
subjects. In this way, our behavioral parameter of interest shares much with that estimated in a natural
field experiment (see Al-Ubaydli and List, 2015).
13
were informed that achieving their targets resulted in donations to charity. Specifically, for
each target achieved in a given month, £10 was donated to a charity of the captains’ choice
on their behalf.29 Therefore, captains in this treatment group each had the opportunity to
donate £30 ($51) per month for a total of £240 ($400) to their chosen charity over the course
of the eight-month trial. Captains were reminded each month of the remaining potential
donations that could result from realizing their targets in the future. To our knowledge,
ours is the first randomized field study to use performance-based charitable incentives to
increase employee effort.30 Table 1 outlines the treatments (see Appendix III for examples
of each of the three feedback reports).
With this type of “build-on” design, our field experiment allows us to assess whether
there are additional benefits of prosocial incentives beyond sole provision of information and
personal targets, the latter of which have an extremely low marginal cost to the principal.31
Within our experiment, we did not change any organizational structures or contracts with
the airline captains, although we recognize that these could be important to productivity
and efficiency.32 Importantly, our design uses incentive schemes that permit full flexibility
for workers to achieve their goals. In this way, rather than mandate or incent a particular
course of action, we follow a more adaptable approach that permits gains to be had in accord
with the captains’ personal and professional discretion.
Further Experimental Details
Randomization. To randomize subjects across the four groups, the pre-experimental
29When captains in the prosocial treatment group were informed of their assignment to treatment, they
were offered the opportunity to choose one of five diverse charities to support with their charitable incentives:
Free the Children, MyClimate, Help for Heroes, Make A Wish UK, and Cancer Research UK. Eighteen
captains selected a charity by emailing the designated project email address, and 67 captains who did not
actively select a charity were defaulted to donate to Free the Children. Captains could choose to remain
anonymous, otherwise exact donations were attributed to each individual (identified by their first initial and
last name).
30See Imas (2014) and Charness et al. (2014) for lab experiments on the effect of charitable incentives
on effort, and Anik et al. (2013) for a field study of unconditional charitable bonuses. Relatedly, field
experimental research into unconditional gifts is a burgeoning area of research—see Gneezy and List (2006);
Bellemare and Shearer (2009); Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2010); Englmaier and Leider (2012); Kube et al. (2012)
and Cohn et al. (2015).
31The closest research to this “free lunch” approach is depicted in the field experiments of Grant and Gino
(2010); Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011); Bradler et al. (2013); Chandler and Kapelner (2013); Gubler et al.
(2013); Ashraf et al. (2014); Ashraf et al. (2014); Kosfeld et al. (2014).
32See Nagin et al. (2002); Hamilton et al. (2003); Karlan and Valdivia (2011); Bandiera et al. (2013);
Bloom et al. (2013); Karlan et al. (2015); Bloom et al. (2015). Our design is the single firm experimental
setting in the insider econometrics approach (Shaw, 2009).
14
data (September-November, 2013) were first blocked on five dummy variables that captured
whether subjects were above or below average for: i) number of engines on aircraft flown, ii)
number of flights executed per month, and iii) attainment for the three selected fuel-relevant
behaviors. The former two variables were those that proved significant in determining our
outcome behaviors in preliminary regressions, while the three target behaviors are our main
dependent variables. Once blocked, subjects in each block were randomly allocated to one
of the four study groups through a matched quadruplet design. To ensure that individual-
specific observable characteristics are balanced across groups, we performed balance tests for
gender, seniority, age, trainer status, and whether the captain participated in the selective
pre-study focus group. In addition to checking for balance across the variables on which the
data were blocked, we checked for balance on flight plan fuel (i.e. as a proxy for average
flight distance) and whether captains flew disproportionately on weekends. In short, an
exploration of all available aspects of captain and flight data reveals that our randomization
was successful in that the observables are balanced across the four experimental conditions
(baseline and three treatments; see Table A1 in Appendix I).
Communication with captains. Two weeks prior to the beginning of the study, all
captains were informed that VAA would be undertaking a study on fuel efficiency as part of
its Change is in the Air sustainability initiative. The initial letter outlined the behaviors to
be measured and the possible study groups to which the captains may be assigned. Captains
in treatment groups were to receive letters the following week to inform them of what to
expect in the coming months. In the final week of January 2014, letters were sent to all
treated captains informing them of the intervention to which they had been assigned. The
letter included a sample feedback report and contained the individual’s targets if he had
been assigned to the targets and prosocial groups.
From February 1, 2014 to October 1, 2014, we gathered all flight-level data on a monthly
basis for each captain and mailed a feedback report to the home address of each treated
captain. Captains were encouraged to engage with the material and send any questions to
an email address created specifically for study inquiries. Once the experiment was complete,
we sent treated captains a debrief letter informing them of their overall monthly results
with respect to their targets (if in the targets or prosocial treatment groups) and their total
charitable donations (if in the prosocial incentives treatment group). All (treatment and
control) captains were informed that a follow-up survey would be sent to their company
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email addresses in early 2015.33
Sample. Our data consists of the entire eligible universe of VAA captains (n = 335),
of which 329 are male and 6 are female. Of the debrief survey respondents, 97 classified
their training as military and 102 as civilian (the remaining declined to state). Eleven
captains are “trusted pilots” who were selected for consultation regarding study feasibility
and communications, and 62 captains are “trainers” who are responsible for updating and
training captains and first officers with the latest flight techniques. Captains ranged from
37 to 64 years of age, where the average captain was 52 years old and had been an employee
of the airline for over 17 years when the study initiated. Captains in the sample flew five
flights per month on average, where the captain flying most averaged almost eight flights
per month and the captain flying least averaged just over two flights per month.34
The resulting dataset consists of 42,012 flights, and 110,489 observations of behavior from
January 2013 through March 2015 for the captains sampled.35 We exclude domestic and re-
positioning flights from our analysis. Among other variables, we observe fuel (kg) onboard
the aircraft at four discrete points in time: departure from the outbound gate, takeoff,
landing, and arrival at the inbound gate. In addition, we observe fuel (kg) passing through
each of the aircraft’s engines during taxi, which provides a precise measure of fuel burned
while on the ground. We also observe flight duration, flight plan variables (i.e. expected
fuel use, flight duration, departure destination, and arrival destination), and aircraft type.
We control for several flight-level variables—e.g., ports of departure and arrival, weather on
departure and arrival, whether the aircraft had just received maintenance (e.g., belly wash,
engine change), and aircraft type—as well as captain-level time-varying observables such as
current contracted work hours and whether the captain had attended the annual Ops Day
33The follow-up survey was designed and administered by the academic researchers alone. Again, captains
were assured that data from their responses would be used for research purposes only, that their responses
would remain anonymous, and that VAA would not be privy to individual-level information provided by
survey respondents.
34During the study, Rolls Royce (Controls and Data Services) provided monthly data to VAA. We (the
academic researchers) almost always received access to the data within two weeks of the start of the month,
and feedback reports were compiled and returned to VAA within 24 hours to be postmarked the following day.
VAA subsequently provided post-study data (October 2014 through March 2015) for persistence analysis.
35Efficient Taxiing data is physically stored on QAR cards inside the aircraft, which are removed every 2-4
days to pull data. These cards can corrupt or overwrite themselves, and also can reach full memory capacity
before being removed. Therefore, data capture for Efficient Taxi is not complete—exactly 37% of flights are
missing data for this metric. The reason for the missing data is purely technical and cannot be influenced
by captains. We regress an indicator variable of missing Efficient Taxi data on treatment indicators and find
no statistically significant relationship at any meaningful level of confidence (individual and joint p > 0.4).
Consequently, this phenomenon should not affect results beyond reducing the power of estimates.
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training.36
3 Experimental Results
Table 2 and Figures 2a-2c provide a summary description of captains’ behaviors before
and during the experimental period. A preliminary insight is that the pre-experimental
behavioral outcomes are balanced across various study groups (see balance table in Appendix
I, Table A1). For instance, roughly 42% of captain observations had efficient Fuel Load before
our experiment started (Table 2, Row 1), and attainment within the experimental groups
is approximately 41-43%. Likewise, figures are similar for Efficient Flight (roughly 31%)
and Efficient Taxi (roughly 33%). None of the differences across groups are statistically
significant at conventional levels.
A second noteworthy insight is the large difference in behaviors before and during the
experiment for the control captains, leading to our first formal result:
Result 1. Captains in the control group change their behavior considerably after they are
informed that they are being monitored.
Preliminary evidence for this result is contained in Column 1 of Table 2. For example,
whereas control captains met our Efficient Flight threshold on 31.1% of flights before the
experiment, they met the threshold on 47.6% of flights during the experiment (p < 0.01).
Likewise, for our Efficient Taxi metric, control captains met the threshold for 50.7% of
flights during the experiment compared to 35.2% before the experiment (p < 0.01). While
the results are not economically large for the Fuel Load variable, they again point in the
same direction as the other two measures: after the control captains become aware that their
actions are being measured, they increase the precision of their fuel load (44.3% versus 42.1%
of flight observations; p < 0.05). Figures 2a-2c provide a visual summary of this result, and
reinforce the substantial difference in captains’ behavior once the experiment began.37
While these results are certainly consistent with Result 1, we have not yet accounted for
the data dependencies that arise from each captain’s provision of more than one data point.
To control for the panel nature of the data set, we estimate a regression model of the form:
36We additionally control for whether each flight was delayed taking off. We find that 19.78% of flights are
delayed by 1-15 minutes and 14.95% are delayed more than 15 minutes in our dataset. We run a regression to
understand whether a delayed flight predicts the three fuel-related behaviors. We find that being more than
15 minutes delayed increases Efficient Fuel Load by 3%, decreases Efficient Flight by 4.2%, and decreases
Efficient Taxi by 2.2%.
37Data on pre-experiment trends were largely flat with noise, ruling out that this result is simply revealing
a general trend of behaviors over time (see Table A6 of Appendix I).
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EfficientBehaviorit = α + Expit · Titβ +Xitγ + ωi + eit
where EfficientBehaviorit equals one if captain i performed the fuel-efficient activity on flight
t, and equals zero otherwise; Expit describes the experimental period; Tit represents a vector
with indicator variables for the three treatments; Xit is a vector of control variables; and ωi
is a captain fixed effect. We include all available and relevant flight variables as controls,
which include weather (temperature and condition) on departure and arrival, number of
engines on the aircraft, airports of departure and arrival, engine washes and changes, and
airframe washes. Additionally, we control for captains’ contracted flying hours and whether
the captain has completed training.38
We estimate the above model for each of the fuel-efficient activities using panel data
from January 2013 through September 2014, and we treat the first day of the experiment as
February 1, 2014, when monitoring of captains begins.39 Three different empirical approaches
yield qualitatively similar results: linear probability model (LPM), probit, and logit. For ease
of interpretation, we only present the results of the LPM in Table 3.40 Robust standard errors
are clustered at the pilot level. As an alternative, we present Newey-West standard errors
for the same model. Furthermore, we estimate an analogous specification in a difference-in-
difference framework which is shown in Table 4.
Estimation results of the LPM model are contained in Table 3. Of import here is the
coefficient estimate of the interaction between the experimental period (“Expt”) and the
control group indicator, which provides a measure of how the control group changed behavior
over time. We find a staggering effect: the control group increased their implementation
of Efficient Flight by 14.4 percentage points (46.3% effect, 0.31 standard deviations (σ),
p < 0.05) and of Efficient Taxi by 12.5 percentage points (36% effect, 0.26σ, p < 0.05).
Figures 3a-3c demonstrate the pre-experimental trends and provide a visual representa-
tion of the differences in implementation of the prescribed metrics before and during the
experiment. We use the whole 2013 period and January 2014 as before the experiment, and
38There are various types of training courses, foremost of which is time spent in the simulator (majority
of training) in which captains must pass assessments; we do not have accurate data on these trainings. We
instead control for attendance at the two-day “Ops Day” seminar, a gathering of small groups of pilots
(approximately 20 per training) for briefing that includes discussion of the goals and directions of the airline
and presentations from various teams, with some informal training for pilots.
39All results are robust to use of receipt of the first feedback report (March 15, 2014) as our start date.
40Results of probit and logit specifications are available upon request.
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estimate a trend for the 13 month period. Across both Fuel Load and Efficient Flight, it is
clear that there is no upward trend for any group before the experiment started. For Efficient
Taxi, we see some slight upward trend, although there is a large increase in the level during
the experimental period across all groups. For robustness, we also estimate the specifications
in Table 3 with a linear trend—see Table A2. It is clear that including this trend changes
the estimates slightly, especially for the Hawthorne effect in Efficient Taxi—the metric drops
by 8.7 percentage points. The Hawthorne effect for Fuel Load increases slightly, by 1.5 per-
centage points. We also analyze different time trends (cubic, polynomial, etc.) and they
provide very similar estimates to the linear trend analysis.41 These insights lend evidence
in favor of the Hawthorne effects and are consistent with the importance of social pressure
in our theoretical structure.42 They do not, however, shed light on the effectiveness of the
treatments in stimulating fuel-efficient behaviors. Results 2-4 address this central question:
Result 2. Providing captains with information on previous performance moderately improves
their fuel efficiency, particularly with respect to Efficient Taxi.
Result 3. The inclusion of personalized targets increases captains’ implementation of all
three measured behaviors: Fuel Load, Efficient Flight, and Efficient Taxi.
Result 4. While captains in the prosocial treatment significantly outperform the control
group, adding a charitable component to the intervention does not induce greater effort than
personalized targets.
Preliminary evidence of Result 2 can be found in Table 2 and Figures 2-4, which demon-
strate that—despite increased performance in Fuel Load and Efficient Flight—the differences
between the information and control groups are rather slight. Yet, there is a considerable
change in Efficient Taxi implementation between the information and control groups (58.8%
versus 50.7%). Table 4 complements the raw data in Table 2 by presenting the standard
difference-in-difference estimates with captain fixed effects, which indicate that the infor-
mation treatment induces captains to engage in more fuel-efficient taxiing behavior. The
41We believe that these analyses are not evidence for the violation of SUTVA, because we assume that
the Hawthorne effect we observe would be applied equally across all groups and not just one or two groups
separately.
42Table A6 presents three separate Dickey-Fuller tests of a unit root in the pre-experimental data for
the three behaviors. The tests provide insight as to whether an upward trend in the pre-experimental
data might explain our sizable Hawthorne effects. We collapse the four study groups and analyze each of
the three behaviors for 51 weeks preceding the captains’ notification of the experiment. For each of the
measured behaviors, we reject the null hypothesis that the data exhibit a unit root and therefore argue that
the metrics were stationary prior to January 2014.
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coefficient estimate suggests that the percentage of flights for which captains receiving the
information treatment turned off at least one engine while taxiing to the gate increased by
8.1 percentage points (p < 0.05) relative to the improvement identified in the control group.
Alternatively, when considering the behavior of captains who receive personalized targets
in addition to information on previous performance, we observe consistent treatment effects
across all three performance metrics. In Tables 2 and 4 and Figures 2-4, we see rather
clearly that the targets treatment moved the metrics for each of the three behaviors in
the fuel-saving direction and, as with the information group, the effects also appear to be
in the fuel-saving direction for the prosocial treatment. Overall, Table 4 shows that the
effects for all three behaviors are statistically significantly different from the control group
at conventional levels for nearly every behavior-treatment combination both with clustered
and Newey-West standard errors (with a lag of one period). For instance, captains in the
targets treatment increased implementation by 3.7 percentage points for Efficient Flight (i.e.
a 7.7% treatment effect, 0.074σ, p < 0.05). Most striking is the effect of the interventions on
the occurrence of Efficient Taxi, which occurred on almost 10 percentage points more flights
for those in the targets treatment (19.1% effect, 0.194σ, p < 0.01).43
Since each treatment builds upon the last—e.g., feedback in the targets group builds upon
that in the information group by adding personalized exogenous targets, holding everything
else constant—we “control” for the contents of previous treatments and are therefore able to
make comparisons across treatments as well. As shown in Table 4, the information treatment
appears to have a positive effect on the incidence of fuel-efficient behaviors compared to
the control group, though motivating captains with personalized targets is more effective
than using information alone. For instance, the information treatment only significantly
increases the Efficient Taxi behavior while targets also significantly increase Efficient Flight.
Furthermore, magnitude and significance of the point estimates are increased for target
captains.
That said, prosocial incentives do not appear to provide substantial additional motivation
for behavior change beyond targets, although they improve upon the information treatment.
The empirical results across the targets and prosocial treatments in Table 4 and Figures 2-4
are nearly identical. To statistically validate these claims, we pool all captains that receive
personalized targets, i.e. target and prosocial treatment groups, and compare the pooled
group to the information treatment in an additional regression. We find that receiving tar-
43We also include specifications where we control for the quadruplet nature of the randomization. Please
see Table A3 for these results. Clearly, these specifications do not significantly change the results.
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gets significantly increases fuel-efficient behavior for Efficient Flight (p < 0.05) and Efficient
Taxi (p < 0.10). A similar exercise also confirms that prosocial incentives do not significantly
improve behavior compared to targets only. Thus, while information is an important mech-
anism in encouraging fuel-efficient behavior change, targets add an additional effect that
prosocial incentives do not further augment. Therefore, of the interventions provided in the
study, the combination of information and targets is the most successful (and cost-effective)
treatment.
In sum, the experimental treatments provide behavioral structure to our theoretical
model. Recall that the effect of information on effort in the model depends on the realized
difference between estimated and actual fuel efficiency. Given that the estimates suggest
a move toward fuel efficiency among captains in the information group (especially with re-
spect to Efficient Taxi), we argue that captains’ ex ante beliefs regarding their fuel efficiency
are optimistic; therefore, information moderately encourages increased fuel efficiency. Our
model suggests that targets set above the baseline performance should (weakly) increase
effort. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that targets improve captains’ attainment of
all three behaviors.
Furthermore, the model predicts that our prosocial treatment should increase effort if a
captain’s altruism is strictly positive and should not affect his effort otherwise. Given that
the performance of captains in this treatment group does not significantly exceed that of
the captains in the targets treatment, we cannot conclude that captains’ altruism is strictly
positive as measured by our experimental manipulation. Finally, according to the model,
captains should allocate effort disproportionately toward the behaviors that require the least
effort. We know from interviews with captains and airline personnel that Efficient Taxiing is
the least effortful behavior of the three we monitored. Our findings support this notion, as
we can clearly conclude that the treatment effect sizes from Efficient Taxiing are significantly
larger than the treatment effect sizes for both Fuel Load and Efficient Flight for all three
treatment groups.44
44Note that we are making positive, not normative, statements. For example, in computing welfare effects,
one might be concerned with treatment impacts on flight duration and safety. Since there is no variation
in safety outcomes (zero incidents or flight diversions due to issues pertaining to fuel), we cannot address
this concern, though we do have information on flight duration. For instance, one means to improve the
chances of an Efficient Flight is that captains fly at efficient speeds and actively seek shortcuts from Air
Traffic Control, which may require that captains accelerate or decelerate relative to their habitual speed
levels or fly shorter routes than they would otherwise.
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Temporal Effects
Importantly, our data provide the ability to go beyond short-run substitution effects and
explore treatment effects in the longer run. In this sub-section, we conduct a more nu-
anced investigation of the treatment effects by exploring their persistence as the experiment
progresses.45 Upon doing so, we find a fifth result:
Result 5. We do not observe decay effects of treatment for captains within the experimental
time frame.
To examine the treatment effects over the course of the experiment, we plot the month-
by-month treatment effects in Figures 4a-4c. The largest effects relative to the baseline
appear to be in May for Fuel Load and Efficient Flight and in April for Efficient Taxi. That
is, the treatment effects appear to be strongest around the middle of the study (and not
immediately after monitoring begins), with no consistent pattern of decay for any of the
three behaviors.
Although our theory does not have a dynamic decay prediction, given the experimental
results in Gneezy and List (2006), Lee and Rupp (2007), Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2010),
and Allcott and Rogers (2014), we expected that our treatment effect might decay through
time. Indeed, our results are more consonant with Hossain and List (2012), who report that
their incentives maintained their influence over several weeks for Chinese manufacturing
workers. What our environment shares with Hossain and List’s is the context of a repeated
intervention whereas the other studies that find a decay effect are typically set within one-
shot work environments or weaker reputational environments. We conjecture that repeated
interaction with subjects serves to habituate the incented behaviors, thereby diminishing
susceptibility to decay effects. Accordingly, this insight serves to enhance our understanding
of the generalizability of the decay insights provided in this literature to date.
Another interesting temporal feature in our data is the persistence of our treatment
effects after the experiment concludes. Upon inspection of the post-experiment data, we
find a sixth result:
Result 6. Treatment effects remain intact for post-flight behavioral adjustments only, though
Hawthorne effects remain high and even increase with the passage of time.
45Relatedly, we also explored a measure of salience in our experiment, namely that behavior changed in
the week following receipt of the message and reverted to the mean thereafter. We do not find such an effect.
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Once again we find preliminary evidence for this result in Table 2. For instance, while
control captains met the Efficient Flight metric on 31.1% of flights before the experiment and
47.6% of flights during the experiment, they actually increased their attainment to 54.8% of
flights in the six-month period following the experiment’s end date. Similarly, control cap-
tains turned off at least one engine while taxiing for 54.7% of flights after the experiment,
compared to 50.7% of flights during the experiment and 35.2% before the experiment. This
post-experiment increase is not present for Fuel Load, but the original boost in implemen-
tation remains after the experiment ends.
Further evidence on persistence is summarized in Tables 5 and A4. In Table 5, we again
see that the control group captains outperform their own pre-experimental attainment with
significance across all three fuel-efficient behaviors, and even more astoundingly so for Ef-
ficient Flight and Efficient Taxi. However, this time we notice that there are only subtle
differences between the treatment groups and the control group—perhaps apart from the Effi-
cient Taxi metric—indicating that the benefits of receiving consistent feedback on high-effort
tasks do not persist once the treatment is removed. We explore this phenomenon further
in Table A4 where we compare the treatment groups to the control group in terms of their
post-experimental versus pre-experimental attainment levels using a difference-in-difference
specification. Findings indicate that there are no significant differences across treatments
for Fuel Load and Efficient Flight. However, we still detect significant increases in terms
of Efficient Taxi for information (p < 0.10), target (p < 0.01), and prosocial (p < 0.01)
treatment groups.
Fuel Savings
Given the substantial treatment effects during the experimental period of the study, we
report an economically significant fuel and cost savings:
Result 7. Our experimental treatments directly led to 704,000 kg in fuel savings and $553,000
in cost savings for our partner airline. These estimates dramatically increase after incorpo-
rating the estimated Hawthorne effect.
To provide support for this result, we present two estimations of fuel saved as a result
of the experimental treatments. We are in a unique position to use engineering and data-
supported fuel estimates to understand the denoted impact of our interventions on efficiency,
and we provide both here given that there are pros and cons to each approach. First, we
apply engineering estimates to assess fuel savings without requiring data on actual fuel usage
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or statistical power to detect differences in fuel use pre- and post-intervention. However,
the engineering estimates do not account for actual changes to fuel usage as a result of
behavior change. While the data-supported estimates do incorporate actual changes to fuel
use as a result of the study, the approach is generally one that requires statistical power
to detect significant differences in fuel use. Our experimental design was powered to detect
differences in fuel-efficient behaviors, not changes in fuel use. As such, we use coefficients that
capture average effects of treatments on fuel use without the statistical power to demonstrate
significance. As a result, we use both engineering estimates and real-time estimates to provide
an approximation of fuel saved and CO2 emissions abated as a result of the treatment groups.
We will also provide the marginal abatement cost of a metric ton (“ton” hereafter) of CO2
as a result of our treatments.
Engineering estimates: VAA projects an average fuel savings of 250 kg per flight
as a result of proper execution of Fuel Load. The 0.7%, 2.1% and 2.5% treatment effects
for the information, targets, and prosocial incentives groups (respectively) correspond to
an increase in the implementation of Fuel Load by 169 flights (saving 250 kg each flight),
equivalent to a savings of 42,250 kg of fuel over an eight-month period. Moreover, VAA
estimates that an Efficient Flight uses (at least) 500 kg less fuel than the alternative, on
average. Our effect sizes for the three groups were 1.7%, 3.7%, and 4.7% (respectively),
which translates to 323 additional “efficient” flights over the eight-month period, or 161,500
kg in fuel savings. Finally, VAA estimates an average fuel wastage of 9 kg per minute if no
engines are shut down while taxiing, and the average treatment effects for the three groups
were 8.1%, 9.7%, and 8.9%, respectively. Given an average taxi-in time of 8 minutes in our
dataset, we approximate fuel savings per flight to be 72 kg. An additional 853 extra flights
having met Efficient Taxi corresponds to a fuel savings of 61,400 kg over the eight-month
study period.
Summing these savings, our interventions led to just under 266,000 kg of fuel saved
over the course of the study. Combining the industry’s standard conversion of 3.1497 kg
of CO2 per kg of fuel burned with the February 2014 global jet fuel price of $786 per
1000 kg, we estimate a cost savings of $209,000 and a CO2 savings of 838,000 kg (i.e.
$31,000 environmental savings using $37/ton of CO2 at 3% discount rate in 2015; Interagency
Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, 2013). Our engineering estimates indicate that
targets provide the largest benefits to social and private efficiency in this context. These
calculations constitute fuel and cost savings stemming directly from the treatments and do
not incorporate the sizable Hawthorne effects, which increase the overall cost savings to
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$1,079,000 and CO2 savings to 4,324,000 kg. The savings associated with the Hawthorne
effects come from 233 more flights having efficient Fuel Load, 1,861 more flights having
Efficient Flight, and 1,616 extra more flights having Efficient Taxi.
Data-supported estimates: Our data allow us to estimate actual fuel savings from
changes in captains’ behavior. We estimate differences in fuel usage from before the experi-
ment to the experimental period and across all groups. In essence, we employ an Intent-to-
Treat approach and use average treatment effects from this difference-in-difference regression
to calculate average and aggregate fuel savings. For Fuel Load, we measure the deviation of
actual fuel load from the “ideal” fuel load—i.e. according to the double iteration calculation.
We then compare deviations within each group across the pre-experimental and the experi-
mental periods, taking into account the Hawthorne effect (See Table A5). In other words, we
report average fuel savings per group that are the sum of the corresponding average treat-
ment effect and the average change from the pre-experimental to the experimental period
for the control group (the Hawthorne effect). In doing so, we assume that the Hawthorne
effect is constant across groups. On average, captains in the information group decreased
fuel use relative to the ideal by 98.5 kg per flight, those in the targets group by 141.3 kg per
flight, and captains in the prosocial group by 159.8 kg per flight.
Similarly, for Efficient Flight, we examine changes in captains’ fuel use relative to the
“ideal” fuel use, or the anticipated fuel use according to the flight plan (adjusted for updates
to ZFW). We find that captains in the information, targets, and prosocial groups reduced
in-flight fuel use by 371.9, 451.6, and 419.9 kg per flight, respectively. Finally, for Efficient
Taxi, we examine changes to fuel use during taxi-in. Fuel savings per flight amounted to 3.7
to 5.1 kg for the information and targets interventions, while the prosocial group increased
fuel use during taxi-in by 5 kg.
As a next step, we take these group-level effects and scale them up by the number of
flights per treatment group. Put differently, total savings for a given treatment cell are
the sum of the average treatment effect and the average Hawthorne effect multiplied by
the number of unique flights during the experimental period. Results from this exercise
are presented in Table 6. Standard error calculations are based on Newey-West standard
errors (lag=1) in the underlying DiD specifications. In aggregate, our interventions led to
roughly 6.83 million kg in fuel savings. Of these savings, about 1.57 million kg were saved
in both the control and information group, whereas the targets and prosocial group saved
more than 1.8 million kg each. Using the same conversions as above (see Table 7), total
savings correspond to cost savings of $5.37 million (equivalent to a reduction of 0.56% of
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overall fuel costs) and CO2 savings of 21.5 million kg. We calculate an approximate MAC
for such behavioral interventions, which is negative (since abatement is highly profitable in
this context). Specifically, the MAC (assuming costless interventions) is simply the price per
ton of jet fuel divided by 3.15 tons CO2 per ton of fuel. Using the February 2014 jet fuel
price of $786 per ton, we calculate an average MAC of -$250.
Interestingly, there are significant differences between the engineering and data-driven
estimates from our study, especially for those numbers accounting for Hawthorne effects.
The disparity may be attributable to underestimates of average savings from the three
behaviors—especially for the Efficient Flight metric—as well as differences in the nature
of the estimations. That is, unlike the engineering estimates, the data-driven estimates do
not account for differences in percentages of flights for which a behavior was met. Rather,
they estimate overall average fuel use changes in the study itself and apply these changes to
all flights. Even if we apply the most conservative fuel savings estimates to the changes in
behavior, we find that these interventions, especially the target groups, led to remarkable
cost-savings and return on investment for the airline. Businesses and policymakers should
take note of the potential cost-effectiveness of such behavioral interventions in mitigating
prominent global externalities.
Heterogeneity and Captain Welfare
We explore various forms of heterogeneity to determine the drivers of our main results
(see Figures 5 and 6 as well as Appendix I). For example, are the results driven by a broad
behavioral shift amongst all captains or a handful of captains adjusting completely? Are
there certain captain types that are more likely to adjust their behavior? To address the
first question, we explore within-captain differences in attainment from the pre-experimental
period to the intervention period. To answer the second question, we explore heterogeneity
based on social preferences.46 We then identify the effects of both treatment assignment
and performance on captains’ self-reported job satisfaction. To assess heterogeneity, we use
information on captains provided by VAA and data gathered directly from captains via an
46To assess captains’ social preferences, we asked two questions regarding individuals’ private charitable
donations in 2013 and in 2014 outside of the context of the study. Captains indicated their donation
behavior by selecting one of ten multiple-choice intervals ranging from Â£0 to Â£200+. In addition, we
asked captains to rank their job satisfaction on a seven-point scale. This question allows us to examine
whether job performance influences job satisfaction—as we propose in our theory—as well as whether our
treatments contribute positively or negatively to captains’ well-being.
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online debrief survey.47
A first result is that the Hawthorne effect is prevalent across captains, as is apparent in
Figures 5a-5c. These figures show the change in average attainment of the three behaviors
for each control captain. Almost all captains increase their implementation of fuel-efficient
behaviors in the experimental period, albeit to varying degrees. Indeed, we find that a
majority of captains improve their performance relative to the baseline for Fuel Load (60%
of captains), Efficient Flight (89% of captains), and Efficient Taxi (82% of captains). Looking
at the raw data (i.e. without controls), the standard deviations around the mean changes in
these behaviors are quite large (Fuel Load: µ = 0.036, σ = 0.105; Efficient Flight: µ = 0.170,
σ = 0.123; Efficient Taxi: µ = 0.147, σ = 0.149).
Turning to the question of whether the treatment effects are uniform across captains,
we construct similar charts that net out the mean change in behavior of the control group
(see Figures 6a-6c). In other words, we deduct the means reported above from each cap-
tains’ average difference in implementation between the pre-experimental and experimental
periods. For example, a captain who implemented Efficient Taxi on 50% of flights before
the experiment and 75% during the experiment experienced a 25% increase in attainment,
but the Hawthorne effect confounds this increase; therefore, we subtract 14.7%—the aver-
age difference among captains in the control group—from 25%, so that the net ‘effect’ on
the captain is a 10.3% increase in implementation of Efficient Taxi. Figure 6 displays such
within-subject differences in attainment for each of the three measured behaviors across
experimental conditions.
There does not appear to be a consistent pattern for Fuel Load and Efficient Flight
indicating predictable heterogeneity of treatment effects according to initial attainment levels
(although targets appear to elicit some strong behavioral responses in both directions for Fuel
Load). However, for Efficient Taxi, relatively low-achieving captains in all three treatment
groups appear to outperform similar captains in the control group. Interestingly, for Fuel
Load, there is a tendency for the highest-achieving captains to respond negatively to the
experiment, perhaps implying a phenomenon akin to “crowding out” of intrinsic motivation.
These results are not significant at conventional levels.
47Each captain received an email on January 29, 2015 with a link to the study debrief survey, and the
survey closed three weeks later. A total of 202 captains at least partially completed the survey and 187
completed it, which represents an impressive 60% (56%) response rate. This response rate was achieved
after sending each captain up to three emails within four weeks offering incentives up to Â£105. We find
that there are no statistically significant differences in terms of survey behavior across treatment groups
(joint F -tests feature p = 0.69 and p = 0.68 for participation and completion indicators, respectively).
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We also examine the impact of social preferences on our treatment effects.48 Table A8
provides estimates from a regression based on the aforementioned DiD econometric spec-
ification with additional triple interactions between the post-treatment indicator variable,
each treatment group, and the social preference parameter. As expected, our proxy for
social preferences helps to predict whether captains will be influenced by our prosocial treat-
ment. We use self-reported donations to charity in 2013 (i.e. before the study began) as
a proxy for “altruism” to determine whether subjects’ (perceived) social preferences influ-
ence their treatment response, particularly to the prosocial incentive treatment. For the
prosocial group, an increase of £10 in past donations increases correct implementation of
Fuel Load by approximately 0.5 percentage points, while social preferences have no effect at
all on those captains in the Information and Targets treatments. Given that Fuel Load is
the most sticky behavior, the increase in implementation by more altruistic captains—who
presumably put more weight on donating to charity through the study than less altruistic
captains—is consistent with both Propositions 4 and 5 (contained in Appendix II).
Beyond these various heterogeneities—and in an era where captains’ well-being is es-
pecially central to airlines’ and travelers’ considerations—one might inquire whether the
captains themselves are better off. We only take a first step down this important path by
considering captains’ job satisfaction. Table A9 presents the intent-to-treat estimates for
the effects of being in each treatment group on job satisfaction. The coefficient estimates
are positive for all treatments. The largest coefficient estimate indicates a positive and
significant effect of prosocial incentives, where captains reported a 0.37 point higher job sat-
isfaction rating than captains in the control group (p = 0.105). For context, this difference
in self-reported job satisfaction is equivalent to that between an employee with poor health
compared to an employee with excellent health (see Clark and Oswald, 1996).
Finally, among the subjects who received personalized targets (i.e. those in the targets
and prosocial groups), captains who met more targets over the course of the experiment ex-
perience greater job satisfaction (see Table A10). Further investigation of this phenomenon
reveals that performance on Efficient Taxi is correlated with this result, increasing job satis-
faction by 0.12 points (on an eleven-point scale) per monthly target met. In other words, a
captain who met all of his Efficient Taxi targets (out of a possible 24) would rate his overall
job satisfaction 3.12 points higher than a captain who did not meet any of his Efficient Taxi
48In similar spirit, we also investigate the impact of seniority and airplane type on outcomes of interest.
These regressions do not lead to additional insights and are available upon request.
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targets.49 Thus, airlines may wish to seek means in which to assist captains in reaching fuel-
efficiency targets for reasons pertaining not only to cost minimization and environmental
outcomes, but also to employee well-being.
4 Discussion
The next time you are sitting on an airplane next to a policymaker, ask her what is the
best way to combat pollution externalities. We have posed this question repeatedly working
alongside Congresswomen, Senators, and policymakers across governmental agencies. The
stock answer is “raise taxes”, “set up a cap and trade scheme”, or “make firms install
particular pollution control devices”. Not once have we heard: target workers and design
incentives for them to produce more sustainably. In this study, we introduce this approach
to combating firm-level pollution externalities.
We showcase this approach by implementing a field experiment in a partnership with
Virgin Atlantic Airways. The overarching goal was to improve the fuel efficiency of their
captains without compromising safety or service quality. While our workplace setting is
complex with myriad competing incentives at play, clear measurement of captains’ behavior
enables innovative strategies to provide the right set of interventions to improve employee
productivity and firm performance. Based on our principal-agent model, we randomize three
interventions to understand the impact on employee performance of basic informational feed-
back, exogenous targets associated with said information, and prosocial incentives associated
with the above targets and information. We find that all three interventions are successful
at inducing fuel-efficient behaviors, and that provision of exogenous targets is the most cost-
effective intervention. We conclude that our inexpensive strategies are both a feasible and a
profitable means to induce airline captains to fly aircraft more efficiently.
Our research speaks to many fields within economics. For example, in labor economics,
how best to incent workers to motivate effort in the workplace has been a principal topic
of inquiry for decades. The imperfect relationship between employees’ effort and produc-
tivity renders firms incapable of rewarding effort with precision (Miller, 1992; Lazear, 1999;
Malcomson, 1999; Prendergast, 1999). A burgeoning experimental literature on incentives
and workplace initiatives attempts to understand the employee-employer relationship and
effective means by which employers may increase effort and productivity (see List and Rasul,
49One should take care not to provide a structural interpretation of this result since it is garnered from
non-experimental variation.
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2011; Levitt and Neckermann, 2014). We attempt to advance this literature by understand-
ing the separate impacts of basic information, personalized targets, and prosocial incentives
on workplace performance in a high-stakes setting among well-salaried, experienced, and
unionized employees. Our setting does not comprise information asymmetry or team pro-
duction externalities (i.e. there is no undetected shirking), and therefore there is potential
to align individual self-interest with firm efficiency.
This research also has clear policy implications with respect to cost-effective greenhouse
gas abatement. We find that the marginal abatement cost (MAC) estimated from no- to
low-cost behavioral interventions is around -$250 (using 2014 prices). To our knowledge,
this MAC is the lowest currently estimated in academic or policy circles. Thus, such “low-
hanging fruits” provide complements—and in some cases perhaps even alternatives—to more
traditional approaches to pollution control. Future research should aim to identify additional
behavioral motivators to improve the efficiency of workers as a means to minimize abatement
costs while simultaneously reducing the operation costs of firms in an effort to promote win-
win strategies for the economy and the environment.
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Figure 1
Global Destinations of VAA
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Figure 2a
Efficient Fuel, by time period
.2
5
.3
.3
5
.4
.4
5
.5
.5
5
.6
.6
5
Fu
el
 L
oa
d 
as
 P
ro
po
rti
on
 o
f F
lig
ht
s
Control Information Targets Prosocial
 
Before During After
Figure 2b
Efficient Flight, by time period
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Figure 2c
Efficient Taxi, by time period
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Figure 3a
Fuel Load before and during the experiment
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Figure 3b
Efficient Flight before and during the experiment
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Figure 3c
Efficient Taxi before and during the experiment
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Figure 4a
Treatment effects for Fuel Load during the experiment
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Figure 4b
Treatment effects for Efficient Flight during the experiment
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Figure 4c
Treatment effects for Efficient Taxi during the experiment
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Figure 5a
Within-subject Changes in Control Group - Average Fuel Load Implementation from Before
to During the Experiment
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Notes: The data points in the graph represent the proportion of flights for which each captain in the Control
Group implemented the Fuel Load behavior before the experiment (January 2013 - January 2014), in as-
cending order of pre-experimental performance. The vertical arrows indicate represent the same proportion
during the experimental period (February 2014 - September 2014). An upward arrow indicates an improve-
ment in implementation (as a proportion of total flights) of the behavior, while a downward arrow indicates
a decline in implementation.
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Figure 5b
Within-subject Changes in Control Group - Average Efficient Flight Implementation from
Before to During the Experiment
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
E
ffi
ci
en
t F
lig
ht
 a
s 
P
ro
po
rti
on
 o
f F
lig
ht
s
Captains (in ascending order of pre-experimental performance)
Notes: The data points in the graph represent the proportion of flights for which each captain in the Control
Group implemented the Efficient Flight behavior before the experiment (January 2013 - January 2014), in
ascending order of pre-experimental performance. The vertical arrows represent the same proportion during
the experimental period (February 2014 - September 2014). An upward arrow indicates an improvement in
implementation (as a proportion of total flights) of the behavior, while a downward arrow indicates a decline
in implementation.
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Figure 5c
Within-subject Changes in Control Group - Average Efficient Taxi Implementation from
Before to During the Experiment
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Notes: The data points in the graph represent the proportion of flights for which each captain in the Control
Group implemented the Efficient Taxi behavior before the experiment (January 2013 - January 2014), in
ascending order of pre-experimental performance. The vertical arrows represent the same proportion during
the experimental period (February 2014 - September 2014). An upward arrow indicates an improvement in
implementation (as a proportion of total flights) of the behavior, while a downward arrow indicates a decline
in implementation.
46
Figure 6a
Within-subject Changes in All Groups - Average Fuel Load Implementation from Before to
During the Experiment (Net of Raw Hawthorne Effects)
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Figure 6b
Within-subject Changes in All Groups - Average Efficient Flight Implementation from Before
to During the Experiment (Net of Raw Hawthorne Effects)
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Figure 6c
Within-subject Changes in Control Group - Average Efficient Taxi Implementation from
Before to During the Experiment
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Table 1
Treatment Group Design
Information Targets Prosocial
Control
Treatment Group 1 X
Treatment Group 2 X X
Treatment Group 3 X X X
50
Table 2
Average Attainment of Fuel Load, Efficient Flight, and Efficient Taxi in all Time Periods
(Raw Data)
Control Treatment 1: Treatment 2: Treatment 3: All Captains
Information Targets Prosocial
Fuel Load
Before Experiment
0.421 0.428 0.434 0.414 0.424
(0.494) (0.495) (0.496) (0.493) (0.494)
5258 obs 5429 obs 5070 obs 5140 obs 20,897 obs
During Experiment
0.443 0.462 0.475 0.458 0.459
(0.497) (0.499) (0.499) (0.498) (0.498)
3321 obs 3330 obs 3016 obs 3258 obs 12,925 obs
After Experiment
0.446 0.446 0.469 0.412 0.442
(0.497) (0.497) (0.499) (0.492) (0.497)
2140 obs 2120 obs 1867 obs 2063 obs 8190 obs
Efficient Flight
Before Experiment
0.311 0.314 0.313 0.312 0.312
(0.463) (0.464) (0.464) (0.463) (0.463)
5258 obs 5429 obs 5070 obs 5140 obs 20,897 obs
During Experiment
0.476 0.503 0.528 0.510 0.504
(0.500) (0.500) (0.499) (0.499) (0.500)
3321 obs 3330 obs 3016 obs 3258 obs 12,925 obs
After Experiment
0.548 0.521 0.536 0.525 0.533
(0.498) (0.500) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499)
2140 obs 2120 obs 1867 obs 2063 obs 8190 obs
Efficient Taxi
Before Experiment
0.352 0.339 0.348 0.318 0.339
(0.478) (0.473) (0.476) (0.466) (0.473)
3380 obs 3596 obs 3260 obs 3341 obs 13,577 obs
During Experiment
0.507 0.588 0.622 0.590 0.575
(0.500) (0.492) (0.485) (0.492) (0.494)
2117 obs 2109 obs 1864 obs 2014 obs 8104 obs
After Experiment
0.547 0.585 0.643 0.607 0.594
(0.498) (0.493) (0.479) (0.489) (0.489)
1277 obs 1201 obs 1090 obs 1218 obs 4786 obs
Notes: The table reports the proportion of flights for which captains in a given group performed each of the
three selected behaviors. Due to random memory errors, Efficient Taxi data is unavailable for 35.0% of pre-
experimental flights and 37.2% of post-experimental flights. This missing data is in no way systematic and
therefore does not bias the results, though it moderately reduces the power of the Efficient Taxi estimates.
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses, which is followed by the total number of observations
(flights) from which the summary statistics are calculated.
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Table 3
Difference in Attainment from Before Experiment to During Experiment for all Experimental
Conditions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fuel Load Eff Flight Eff Taxi Fuel Load Eff Flight Eff Taxi
Expt · Control 0.018 0.144*** 0.125*** 0.018* 0.144*** 0.125***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Expt · Information 0.025* 0.161*** 0.206*** 0.025** 0.161*** 0.206***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.019) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Expt · Targets 0.039*** 0.181*** 0.222*** 0.039*** 0.181*** 0.222***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.022) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014)
Expt · Prosocial 0.043*** 0.191*** 0.214*** 0.043*** 0.191*** 0.214***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.022) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Observations 33,822 33,822 21,681 33,822 33,822 21,681
N 335 335 335 335 335 335
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard Errors:
Clustered Yes Yes Yes
Newey-West Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table shows the results of two panel linear probability regressions with captain fixed effects for
conventional robust standard errors and Newey-West standard errors with a lag of one period. The regressions
compare pre-experiment behavior (January 2013-January 2014) to behavior during the experiment ‘Expt’
(February 2014-September 2014) for all experimental conditions, including the control group. We present
the results of panel OLS specification—as opposed to those of panel logit or probit specifications—due to
constraints on the conditional logit/probit models, which cannot provide marginal effects due to lack of
estimation of fixed effects (i.e. intercepts), though results for post-estimation of the various models are
nearly identical. The dependent variables in the regressions are dummies capturing whether the fuel-efficient
behavior was performed, and since predicted values are not constrained between 0 and 1, we do not report
a constant and instead focus on treatment effects. As such, the coefficients indicate the proportion of flights
for which the behavior of interest was successfully performed. Robust errors are clustered at the captain
level. Controls include weather on departure and arrival, number of engines on the aircraft, aircraft type,
ports of departure and arrival, aircraft maintenance, captains’ contracted hours, and whether the captain
has completed training. ∗∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗p < 0.05 ∗p < 0.10
52
Table 4
Treatment Effect Identification using Difference-in-Difference Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fuel Load Eff Flight Eff Taxi Fuel Load Eff Flight Eff Taxi
Expt 0.018 0.144*** 0.125*** 0.018 0.144*** 0.125***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Expt · Information 0.007 0.017 0.081*** 0.007 0.017 0.081***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.025) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017)
Expt · Targets 0.021 0.037** 0.097*** 0.021 0.037** 0.097***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.026) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018)
Expt · Prosocial 0.025 0.047*** 0.089*** 0.025* 0.047*** 0.089***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.027) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018)
Observations 33,822 33,822 21,681 33,822 33,822 21,681
N 335 335 335 335 335 335
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard Errors:
Clustered Yes Yes Yes
Newey-West Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table shows the results of two difference-in-difference regression specifications with captain fixed
effect comparing pre-experiment behavior (January 2013-January 2014) to behavior during the experiment
(February 2014-September 2014). The dependent variables in the regressions are dummies capturing whether
the fuel-efficient behavior was performed, and since predicted values are not constrained between 0 and 1,
we do not report a constant and instead focus on treatment effects. As such, the coefficients indicate
the increase in the proportion of flights beyond the control group for which the behavior of interest was
successfully performed. We provide conventional robust standard errors which are clustered at the captain
level and Newey-West standard errors (lag=1). Total flight observations are provided. Controls include
weather on departure and arrival, number of engines on the aircraft, aircraft type, ports of departure and
arrival, aircraft maintenance, captains’ contracted hours, and whether the captain has completed training.
∗∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗p < 0.05 ∗p < 0.10
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Table 5
Persistence: Difference in Attainment from Before Experiment to After Experiment for all
Experimental Conditions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fuel Load Eff Flight Eff Taxi Fuel Load Eff Flight Eff Taxi
Post · Control 0.049** 0.215*** 0.152*** 0.049** 0.215*** 0.152***
(0.024) (0.021) (0.035) (0.021) (0.020) (0.029)
Post · Information 0.042* 0.195*** 0.192*** 0.042** 0.195*** 0.192***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.040) (0.021) (0.019) (0.030)
Post · Targets 0.067*** 0.218*** 0.209*** 0.067*** 0.218*** 0.209***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.037) (0.021) (0.019) (0.030)
Post · Prosocial 0.029 0.217*** 0.210*** 0.029 0.217*** 0.210***
(0.025) (0.021) (0.037) (0.021) (0.019) (0.030)
Observations 29,087 29,087 18,363 29,087 29,087 18,363
N 335 335 335 335 335 335
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard Errors:
Clustered Yes Yes Yes
Newey-West Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table shows the results of two panel linear probability regressions with captain fixed effects
for conventional robust standard errors and Newey-West standard errors with a lag of one period. The
regressions compare pre-experiment behavior (January 2013-January 2014) to post-experiment behavior
(“Post”: October 2014-March 2015) for all experimental conditions, including the control group. We present
the results of panel OLS specification—as opposed to those of panel logit or probit specifications—due to
constraints on the conditional logit/probit models, which cannot provide marginal effects due to lack of
estimation of fixed effects (i.e. intercepts), though results for post-estimation of the various models are
nearly identical. The dependent variables in the regressions are dummies capturing whether the fuel-efficient
behavior was performed, and since predicted values are not constrained between 0 and 1, we do not report
a constant and instead focus on treatment effects. As such, the coefficients indicate the proportion of flights
for which the behavior of interest was successfully performed. Robust errors are clustered at the captain
level. Controls include weather on departure and arrival, number of engines on the aircraft, aircraft type,
ports of departure and arrival, aircraft maintenance, captains’ contracted hours, and whether the captain
has completed training. ∗∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗p < 0.05 ∗p < 0.10
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Table 6
Data-Supported Estimates of Fuel Savings (in tons)
Fuel Load Efficient Flight Efficient Taxi Total Per Flight
Control -425.48*** -1,146.46*** -1,45 -1,573.38 -0.474
(80.51) (102.26) (13.17)
Information -327.88*** -1,238.44*** -12.21 -1,578.52 -0.474
(76.37) (96.51) (11.86)
Targets -426.03*** -1,361.95*** -15.28 -1,803.26 -0.598
(66.58) (83.53) (12.50)
Prosocial -520.53*** -1,368.16*** 16.30 -1,872.39 -0.575
(78.65) (97.58) (12.60)
Total -1,699.91 -5,115.01 -12.63 -6,827.55 -0.828
Notes: The table presents estimates of total fuel savings by treatment group. Savings are based on regression
coefficients from a difference-in-difference specification with captain fixed effects comparing pre-experiment
behavior (January 2013-January 2014) to behavior during the experiment (February 2014-September 2014).
The dependent variable is the deviation from ideal fuel usage in each of the three flight periods as described
in the text. We calculate fuel savings with an Intent-to-Treat approach where the regression coefficient of
each group (i.e. the group’s average treatment effect) and the average Hawthorne effect (i.e. the coefficient of
the Experimental-period indicator) are multiplied by the number of flights in each group (3321, 3330, 3016,
and 3258 respectively). In other words, we assume that the Hawthorne effect is proportional to the number
of flights. Standard error calculations are based on Newey-West standard errors (lag=1). Controls include
weather on departure and arrival, number of engines on the aircraft, aircraft type, ports of departure and
arrival, aircraft maintenance, captains’ contracted hours, and whether the captain has completed training.
∗∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗p < 0.05 ∗p < 0.10
Table 7
Costs of Fuel Usage
Purchase Cost CO2 Cost Total Cost
Fuel (1 ton) $786 $116.55 $902.55
Notes: The table shows the cost of fuel usage. We use global jet fuel prices in February 2014 (first month
of treatment), estimates of the social cost of carbon of $37/ton, and the September 30, 2014 exchange rate
(1$ = 0.6167£) for all calculations. One ton of fuel emits about 3.15 tons of CO2. These values are used for
calculations of savings in the text.
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A Appendix I: Additional Tables
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Table A2
Difference in Attainment from Before Experiment to During Experiment for all Experimental
Conditions with Time Components
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fuel Load Eff Flight Eff Taxi Fuel Load Eff Flight Eff Taxi
Expt · Control 0.033** 0.132*** 0.038** 0.030 0.237*** 0.118***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.023) (0.021) (0.026)
Expt · Information 0.040*** 0.149*** 0.117*** 0.037 0.254*** 0.196***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.023) (0.021) (0.026)
Expt · Targets 0.055*** 0.169*** 0.134*** 0.053** 0.274*** 0.213***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (0.023) (0.021) (0.027)
Expt · Prosocial 0.058*** 0.179*** 0.126*** 0.055** 0.283*** 0.206***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (0.023) (0.021) (0.027)
Observations 33,822 33,822 21,681 33,822 33,822 21,681
N 335 335 335 335 335 335
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Component:
Linear Trend Yes Yes Yes
Month-of-Sample FEs Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table shows the results of two panel linear probability regressions with captain fixed effects for
Newey-West standard errors with a lag of one period. The regressions compare pre-experiment behavior
(January 2013-January 2014) to behavior during the experiment ‘Expt’ (February 2014-September 2014) for
all experimental conditions, including the control group. Columns (1)-(3) include a linear trend component;
columns (4)-(6) include month-of-sample fixed effects. We present the results of panel OLS specification—as
opposed to those of panel logit or probit specifications—due to constraints on the conditional logit/probit
models, which cannot provide marginal effects due to lack of estimation of fixed effects (i.e. intercepts),
though results for post-estimation of the various models are nearly identical. The dependent variables in the
regressions are dummies capturing whether the fuel-efficient behavior was performed, and since predicted
values are not constrained between 0 and 1, we do not report a constant and instead focus on treatment effects.
As such, the coefficients indicate the proportion of flights for which the behavior of interest was successfully
performed. Robust errors are clustered at the captain level. Controls include weather on departure and
arrival, number of engines on the aircraft, aircraft type, ports of departure and arrival, aircraft maintenance,
captains’ contracted hours, and whether the captain has completed training. ∗∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗p < 0.05 ∗p < 0.10
58
Table A3
Treatment Effect Identification using Difference-in-Difference Regression with Quadruplet
Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fuel Load Eff Flight Eff Taxi Fuel Load Eff Flight Eff Taxi
Expt 0.022 0.146*** 0.140*** 0.022** 0.146*** 0.140***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
Expt · Information 0.017 0.023 0.065*** 0.017 0.023** 0.065***
(0.020) (0.016) (0.022) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014)
Expt · Targets 0.022 0.041** 0.092*** 0.022* 0.041*** 0.092***
(0.020) (0.016) (0.022) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Expt · Prosocial 0.011 0.042*** 0.078*** 0.011 0.042*** 0.078***
(0.019) (0.016) (0.023) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014)
Observations 33,822 33,822 21,681 33,822 33,822 21,681
N 335 335 335 335 335 335
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard Errors:
Clustered Yes Yes Yes
Newey-West Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table shows the results of two difference-in-difference regression specifications with quadruplet
fixed effects comparing pre-experiment behavior (January 2013-January 2014) to behavior during the exper-
iment (February 2014-September 2014). The dependent variables in the regressions are dummies capturing
whether the fuel-efficient behavior was performed, and since predicted values are not constrained between 0
and 1, we do not report a constant and instead focus on treatment effects. As such, the coefficients indicate
the increase in the proportion of flights beyond the control group for which the behavior of interest was
successfully performed. We provide conventional robust standard errors which are clustered at the captain
level and Newey-West standard errors (lag=1). Total flight observations are provided. Controls include
weather on departure and arrival, number of engines on the aircraft, aircraft type, ports of departure and
arrival, aircraft maintenance, captains’ contracted hours, and whether the captain has completed training.
∗∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗p < 0.05 ∗p < 0.10
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Table A4
Persistence: Treatment Effect Identification using Difference-in-Difference Regression com-
paring Before Experiment to After Experiment for all Experimental Conditions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fuel Load Eff Flight Eff Taxi Fuel Load Eff Flight Eff Taxi
Post 0.049** 0.215*** 0.152*** 0.049** 0.215*** 0.152***
(0.024) (0.021) (0.035) (0.021) (0.020) (0.029)
Post · Information -0.007 -0.021 0.040 -0.007 -0.021 0.040*
(0.020) (0.021) (0.030) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021)
Post · Targets 0.018 0.003 0.057** 0.018 0.003 0.057***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.026) (0.018) (0.017) (0.022)
Post · Prosocial -0.020 0.002 0.058** -0.020 0.002 0.058***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.025) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021)
Observations 29,087 29,087 18,363 29,087 29,087 18,363
N 335 335 335 335 335 335
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard Errors:
Clustered Yes Yes Yes
Newey-West Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table shows the results of two difference-in-difference regression specifications with captain
fixed effect comparing pre-experiment behavior (January 2013-January 2014) to post-experiment behavior
(“Post”: October 2014-March 2015). The dependent variables in the regressions are dummies capturing
whether the fuel-efficient behavior was performed, and since predicted values are not constrained between 0
and 1, we do not report a constant and instead focus on treatment effects. As such, the coefficients indicate
the increase in the proportion of flights beyond the control group for which the behavior of interest was
successfully performed. We provide conventional robust standard errors which are clustered at the captain
level and Newey-West standard errors (lag=1). Total flight observations are provided. Controls include
weather on departure and arrival, number of engines on the aircraft, aircraft type, ports of departure and
arrival, aircraft maintenance, captains’ contracted hours, and whether the captain has completed training.
∗∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗p < 0.05 ∗p < 0.10
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Table A5
Data-Supported Estimates of Average Fuel Savings per Flight (in kilograms)
Fuel Load Efficient Flight Efficient Taxi
Control -128.12*** -345.21*** -0.43
(24.24) (30.79) (3.97)
Information -98.46*** -371.90*** -3.67
(22.93) (28.98) (3.56)
Targets -141.26*** -451.57*** -5.07
(22.07) (27.69) (4.14)
Prosocial -159.77*** -419.94*** 5.00
(24.14) (29.95) (3.87)
Notes: The table presents estimates of average fuel savings by treatment group. Savings are based on re-
gression coefficients from a difference-in-difference specification with captain fixed effects comparing pre-
experiment behavior (January 2013-January 2014) to behavior during the experiment (February 2014-
September 2014). The dependent variable is the deviation from ideal fuel usage in each of the three flight
periods as described in the text. We calculate fuel savings with an Intent-to-Treat approach where we
sum the regression coefficient of each group (i.e. the group’s average treatment effect) and the average
Hawthorne effect (i.e. the coefficient of the Experimental-period indicator). In other words, we assume that
the Hawthorne effect is constant across grous. Standard error calculations are based on Newey-West stan-
dard errors (lag=1). Controls include weather on departure and arrival, number of engines on the aircraft,
aircraft type, ports of departure and arrival, aircraft maintenance, captains’ contracted hours, and whether
the captain has completed training. ∗∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗p < 0.05 ∗p < 0.10
Table A6
Test of a Unit Root of Pre-Experiment Behaviors
Fuel Load Eff Flight Eff Taxi
Z(t) -3.765*** -2.562* -6.431***
(0.003) (0.010) (0.000)
Observations (weeks) 51 51 51
Notes: The table shows the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test for a unit root for the 51 weeks before the experiment
started, collapsing all the groups into one for each behavior. The null of the DF test is a unit root, and the
rejection of the null is that the data follows a random walk. Z(t) is the DF test statistic. ∗∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗p <
0.05 ∗p < 0.10
61
Table A7
Difference-in-Difference Regression of Flight Time
Flight Time
Post 1.788***
(0.522)
Post · Information 0.011
(0.687)
Post · Targets 0.114
(0.733)
Post · Prosocial -1.586*
(0.849)
N 335 subjects
Observations 33,822
Controls Yes
Notes: The dependent variable in this regression is flight time in minutes. Captain fixed effects are included
and Newey-West standard errors (lag = 1) are reported below estimates in parentheses. Total flight obser-
vations are provided. Controls include weather on departure and arrival, number of engines on the aircraft,
aircraft type, ports of departure and arrival, aircraft maintenance, captains’ contracted hours, and whether
the captain has completed training. ∗∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗p < 0.05 ∗p < 0.10
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Table A8
Heterogeneity Analysis: Interactions between Social Preferences and Treatment Effects
Social Preferences
Fuel Load Eff Flight Eff Taxi
Expt 0.0501* 0.1447*** 0.0980***
(0.0284) (0.0268) (0.0365)
Information -0.0145 0.0186 0.0334
(0.0244) (0.0219) (0.0312)
Targets -0.0100 0.0257 0.0087
(0.0248) (0.0229) (0.0317)
Prosocial -0.0908*** -0.0090 -0.1060***
(0.0227) (0.0204) (0.0278)
Expt · Information -0.0005 -0.0277 0.0340
(0.0386) (0.0360) (0.0497)
Expt · Targets 0.0236 0.0864** 0.1215**
(0.0400) (0.0380) (0.0492)
Expt · Prosocial -0.0519 0.0150 0.1488***
(0.0359) (0.0335) (0.0447)
Don13 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Expt · Don13 -0.0002 -0.0000 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Info · Don13 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0004**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Targets · Don13 -0.0001 -0.0003** -0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Prosocial · Don13 0.0003** 0.0000 0.0007***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Expt · Information · Don13 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Expt · Targets · Don13 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Expt · Prosocial · Don13 0.0005** 0.0002 -0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Observations 18,776 18,776 11,987
N 187 187 187
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table shows the results of a difference-in-difference regression specification comparing pre-experiment behavior
(January 2013-January 2014) to behavior during the experiment (February 2014-September 2014). The dependent variables in
the regressions are dummies capturing whether the fuel-efficient behavior was performed, and since predicted values are not
constrained between 0 and 1, we do not report a constant and instead focus on treatment effects. As such, the coefficients indicate
the increase in the proportion of flights beyond the control group for which the behavior of interest was successfully performed.
Newey-West standard errors (lag = 1) are reported below estimates in parentheses. Total flight observations are provided. The
covariate specific to this regression is captains’ pro-social behavior proxied by donations in 2013 (Don13 captures the midpoints
of ten donation amount intervals). Interactions of this variable with all treatment groups are reported as well. Other controls
include weather on departure and arrival, number of engines on the aircraft, aircraft type, ports of departure and arrival, aircraft
maintenance, captains’ contracted hours, and whether the captain has completed training. ∗∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗p < 0.05 ∗p < 0.10
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Table A9
Job Satisfaction and Treatment Group
Job Satisfaction
Information 0.212
(0.224)
Targets 0.0242
(0.249)
Prosocial 0.365
(0.224)
Constant 5.58***
(0.174)
N 202
Notes: The dependent variable in this regression is a 7-point scale of job satisfaction, where self-reported
job satisfaction increases in the scale. Robust standard errors are reported below estimates in parentheses.
∗∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗p < 0.05 ∗p < 0.10
Table A10
Job Satisfaction and Job Performance
Groups Control and Information Targets and Prosocial
Job Satisfaction Job Satisfaction
Fuel Load Targets Met 0.042 - 0.065 -
(0.052) (0.060)
Eff Flight Targets Met -0.071 - -0.017 -(0.056) (0.054)
Eff Taxi Targets Met 0.037 - 0.120** -(0.038) (0.054)
Overall Targets Met - 0.000 - 0.058*
(0.025) (0.025)
Constant 5.714*** 5.687*** 5.341*** 5.326***
(0.263) (0.258) (0.358) (0.326)
N N=103 subjects N=99 subjects
Obs 103 99
Controls None None
Notes: The dependent variable in these regressions is a 7-point scale of job satisfaction, where self-reported
job satisfaction increases in the scale. Robust standard errors are reported below estimates in parentheses.
The independent variables indicate the number of targets met per behavior and overall over the course of
the study. ∗∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗p < 0.05 ∗p < 0.10
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B Appendix II: Theoretical Model
B.1 Model Setup
We consider a static choice-problem that determines a captain’s chosen effort on the job in a
certain period. In our model, we assume that captains, who have vast flying experience, are
at an equilibrium fuel usage with respect to their wealth, experience, effort, and concerns
for safety, the environment, and company profitability.50
A captain faces the following additively separable utility function:
U(w, s, e, f, g) = u(w, e, g) + a · v(d(e) · g, g0, G−i) + y(s, e, f)− c(e)− s(e) (1)
where u(·) is utility from monetary wealth, v(·) is utility from giving to charity (pro-social
behavior), y(·) is utility from job performance, c(·) is disutility from exerting effort, and
s(·) describes disutility from social pressure. Effort is chosen for all three flight tasks, j,
i.e. Fuel Load, Efficient Flight, and Efficient Tax. Captains observe their effort perfectly.
They also receive a noisy signal of fuel usage fit + it = f¯it. fit describes the estimated
fuel usage by captain i for flight t which depends on the chosen effort for the fuel-efficient
activities. f¯it is actual fuel use, observed ex post by the airline, which also includes a random
component.51 Furthermore, each captain has an ideal fuel usage fI , which is based on her
own experience and environmental and firm profit preferences. By revealed preference the
equilibrium pre-study fuel usage fI = f¯ .
Experimental treatments in this study alter three model parameters. First, receiving
information on fuel use, i = 1(information), removes the noisiness of the fuel signal, i.e.
fit + (1− i)it = f¯it. Second, provision of a target, r = 1(target), changes the captain’s ideal
fuel usage, fI , because the employer exogenously imposes a target level. Then, fI = fT if
r = 1 where fT reflects the signaled optimal usage from the point of view of the airline.
Third, in the pro-social behavior treatment a donation, g, is made by the airline in the name
of the captain. This donation is conditional on meeting the target which has a probability
50In a survey, captains in the study expressed a concern over fuel usage and fuel cost, both for environ-
mental reasons and company profitability. To become an airline captain requires many years of training and
experience within an airline; if a captain loses her job with one airline and seeks employment in another, she
loses her prior seniority and must work for many years to reinstate it. Thus, for the sake of their own job
security, captains care about minimizing fuel costs.
51Due to the vast experience of captains, we assume E(it) = 0, i.e. captains predict fuel usage correctly,
on average.
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of d(e) in this treatment.52 In all other treatments, reaching particular fuel use levels does
not lead to donations, i.e. d(e) = 0. Parameters and elements of the utility function are
explained in more detail below.
(Dis)utility from social pressure. In the spirit of DellaVigna et al. (2012, “DLM” here-
after) and Bénabou and Tirole (2006), we assume that captains are either affected by social
pressure due to their actions being observed or exhibit some sort of social signaling in which
they want to appear to be good employees. In this framework, captains are aware of an op-
timal, social effort level, esocial. Because exerting effort is costly to the captain and because
her actions are imperfectly observed with probability piobserved < 1, generally e < esocial.53
In this study, captains in both the control group and treatment group are made aware that
their actions are monitored and data on their effort are used for an internal and academic
study. Consequently, we expect the probability of detection of deviations from the social
effort level to increase for all participants in the study relative to the pre-study period, i.e.
piobservedstudy > pi
observed
pre . We parameterize social pressure as follows:
s(e) = [piobserved · (esocial − e) + (1− piobserved) · 0] · 1(e < esocial)
Social pressure decreases utility if the chosen effort level is below the socially optimal
effort level of the captain. This disutility is increasing in the distance from the optimal
effort level and in the probability of these actions being observed by the airline. The second
term captures the fact that unobserved deviations do not lead to disutility. For agents that
exert more effort than esocial, s(e) simply drops out of their utility function. Consequently,
captains can directly impact the level of disutility by exerting more (costly) effort.
Note that s(e) enters the utility of every captain below the social effort level, regardless of
treatment assignment. If social pressure is important, even control captains should respond
to this increased cost of low effort.54 Because s(e) is orthogonal to treatment, we omit it in
52Captains can directly influence the probability with their effort. That is, captains can be certain that
they do not meet a target if they put in little effort, and they can be certain that they have achieved the
target if they put in sufficient effort.
53It is plausible to argue that effort is perfectly observed in the aviation industry with modern technology.
However, captains might not expect these data to be analyzed on a regular basis.
54Alternatively, we could interpret esocial as a level of effort induced by the researcher, leading to
experimenter-demand effects. Put differently, pilots in the study could think they are expected to increase
effort and not doing so imposes utility costs on them.
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the following discussion and in the derivation of comparative statics.55
Utility from wealth. Similar to DLM, for wealth w, charitable giving from the airline g
for meeting the target (if applicable), and other charitable giving g0, u is defined as follows:
u(w, e, g) = u(w − g0(d(e) · g) + a˜ · d(e) · g)
where a˜ =

0 if a < 0
a if 0 ≤ a ≤ 1
1 if a > 1
Private consumption is an individual’s wealth minus the amount given to charity from
that person’s wealth (i.e. not from this study). However, to ensure that u is continuously
differentiable, we need to account for the effect of charitable donations resulting from our
treatments on utility from private consumption. To capture this effect, we multiply the
individual’s expected donation, d(e)·g, by a function of a—a parameter capturing preferences
for giving—which we call a˜. As in DLM, the parameter a is non-negative in the case of pure
or impure altruism and negative in the case of spite56, and a˜ is simply a truncated at 0 and
1.
The reasons for creating such boundaries on the term capturing preferences for giving are
twofold. First, an individual with spiteful preferences (a < 0) does not get less utility from
private consumption when she donates to charity than when she does not donate to charity;
therefore, a˜ is censored from below at 0. Second, an individual with pure or impure altruistic
preferences will get additional utility from her private consumption by giving to charity
through our treatment because it corresponds to an outward shift in the budget constraint
in the dimension of giving to the chosen charity. However, a˜ is censored from above at 1
because an individual will experience weakly more utility from increases in w than from
giving to the chosen charity (i.e. ∂u
∂w
≥ ∂u
∂g
). This relation holds since increases in w shift the
budget constraint outward in all dimensions—including the charitable giving dimension—so
55Social pressure is additively separable from other utility elements in a linear model. Consequently, it
does not affect the sign of comparative statics derived below and, if interactions are present, only attenuates
treatment effect estimates.
56As defined in Andreoni (1989, 1990), pure and impure altruism capture two possible motivations for
giving. The first stems from a preference solely for provision of the public good, so that an individual’s
donations are entirely crowded out by donations from other sources. Impure altruism, on the other hand,
refers to the phenomenon whereby individuals receive direct utility from the act of giving itself, i.e. through
“warm glow”. Spite, as defined in DLM, exists when an individual gets disutility from donating to the charity.
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these must be weakly preferred to shifts in only one dimension. This stipulation is important
to assume differentiability in u in a standard expected utility framework, as in DLM.
Please note that the amount an individual gives to other charities will be related to the
amount that she gives to charity in the context of this study. Captains will smooth their
consumption for giving. If a captain normally gives $100 to charity each year and this year
she gives $10 through the context of the study, we would expect her total giving to be
between $100 and $110, or g0 + g ∈ [100, 110]. The realization of the sum depends on the
value of a and whether a stems from pure altruism, impure altruism, or spite. We should
expect that an individual who has a negative a value does not donate to charity outside of
the context of this study since donating to charity decreases that individual’s utility.
Utility from charitable giving. The v term is also adapted from DLM and follows the
same properties for each type of individual (pure or impure altruistic and spiteful). The
main difference between the v term in this study and that in DLM is that in this study,
not everyone has the opportunity to donate to charity (i.e. d(e) > 0 for only one treatment
group). We also assume that v is separable in its parameters, as follows:
v(d(e) · g, g0, G−i) = v1(d(e) · g,G−i) + v2(θg0, G−i)
where θ is the cost of giving through channels other than the study and G−i is total giving by
other individuals. In this specification, v1 represents utility from giving in the study context
and v2 represents utility from giving from one’s personal wealth. Note that v1(0, G−i) = 0
since if d(e) = 0, then a captain is not able to donate to the charity through the context
of the study, so v1 should not affect the utility function (similar to the spite case). Based
on the arguments made above with respect to consumption smoothing, v|d=0 ≤ v|d=p, 0 =
v1|d=0 ≤ v1|d=p, v2|d=0 ≥ v2|d=p. That is, a captain’s utility from giving is at least as high
for those captains for whom d(e) = p as it is for those captains for whom d(e) = 0, which
follows from our assumption that giving in the study context can only decrease giving from
one’s own wealth or not affect it at all. Finally, since ∂p
∂e
> 0, we have ∂v
∂e
≥ 0.
In the case of pure altruism, an individual should get the same utility from giving to
charity from her personal wealth as from giving to charity through the context of the study,
since the benefit to the charity is identical. In this sense, v can be thought to represent
the charity’s production function. In the case of impure altruism, an individual should also
get the same utility from donating to charity through her personal wealth as she does from
donating through the context of the study because the amount donated on her behalf is the
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same. Lastly, in the case of spite, g0 = 0 since giving to charity decreases utility and so those
individuals will not give to charity independently of the study. Note, v(0) = 0 because if a
person does not give to charity in person then her utility from giving to charity in person is
0.
Utility from job performance. Since captains care about fuel efficiency, and since imposing
exogenous targets on performance affects a captain’s perception of how well she is doing her
job, we include a parameter y capturing job performance.57 We assume y is separable in
safety (s) and fuel (f) because changes in fuel as a result of the study do not affect safety
levels, as argued in our assumption above. A captain whose performance exceeds her target
will achieve higher utility under this parameter than a captain who does not achieve her
target. Similarly, a captain will experience less (more) utility the further below (above)
the target is her performance. We therefore incorporate job performance into the model as
follows:
y(s, e, f) = y1(s) + y2(e, f) = y1(s) + y2(−f¯ | − fI)
where
y2(−f¯ | − fI) = y2m(−f¯) + y2n(−f¯ | − fI)
and
y2n(−f¯ | − fI) = r · µ(y2m(−f¯)− y2m(−fI))
Here, y2 is defined as in Köszegi and Rabin (2006, “KR” hereafter). We denote the com-
ponents of y2 “m” and “n” to mirror the notation in KR. As in KR, m represents the
“consumption utility” and n represents the “gain-loss utility.” These terms are separable
across dimensions. Finally, µ is the “universal gain-loss function” and has the associate
properties outlined in KR. To be clear, we use the targets in our second treatment group as
an exogenous reference point that airline captains perceive as a reference point.
Note that pilots get utility from using less fuel ∂y2
∂f
≤ 0 and, conditional on receiving
a reference point, get utility (disutility) from performing above (below) the target, which
57Evidence indicates that influencing job performance positively influences job satisfaction (or utility),
whether through increased self-esteem or perceived managerial support for autonomous decision-making
(Christen et al., 2006; Pugno and Depedri, 2009).
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increases with distance from the target according to µ. We assume µ is linear and µ(x) = ηx
if x > 0 and µ = ηλx if x ≤ 0 for η > 0, λ > 1, in accordance with theories of loss aversion.
Moreover, following naturally from our definition of µ, we assume y(x) = x. If a captain
does not receive a reference point, her utility does not comprise gain-loss utility, so for these
individuals y2 = y2m. That is, if r = 0, captains do not receive information regarding ideal
performance with respect to fuel efficiency, so their job performance parameter depends
solely on fuel consumption.58
Additionally, based on industry standards and emphasis on safety—as well as the design
of the treatments—we assume that captains’ job performance utility from flying safely is
constant across treatments, therefore:
∂y
∂s
= S ≥ 0
(Dis)utility from effort. Finally, c represents the cost of effort. Importantly, the individual
cost functions for each fuel-efficient task are allowed to differ to convey that various tasks
have different costs associated with them. The cost structure is a function of the difficulty
of the task itself (e.g., it may be easier to turn off one engine after landing than to have
an efficient flight for several hours) and resistance due to previous habit formation (e.g.,
captains who for many years have not properly performed the Zero Weight Fuel calculation
may find it difficult or bothersome to begin doing so). Additionally, the costs for each task
are separable since the tasks are done independently. Therefore,
c(e) =
∑
j
cj(ej)
For a captain to decrease her fuel use, she must also increase her effort, i.e. ∂f
∂e
< 0. Note
that c(e) is subtracted in the utility equation, so ∂U
∂c
< 0, ∂c
∂e
> 0. Based on interviews with
captains, the cost of effort increases at an increasing rate. Defining the cost of effort as a
quadratic function of effort implies that the cost of effort increases with the amount of effort
exerted (i.e. ∂2c
∂e2 > 0).
58To be clear, given that our reference point is exogenously imposed, one cannot clearly assess whether
the individual captain is better off in the targets group than in another group.
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B.2 Model Predictions
Captains will choose how much effort to exert based on the treatments (information, targets,
prosocial incentives) as in the moral hazard model (see Hölmstrom, 1979). The model is
simplified because agents are current employees whose base salaries are not affected by the
study. The treatments do affect job satisfaction and charitable giving, however. Different
treatments represent different contracts.
We now define V (−f) to be the utility of the firm (the principal) from the perspective of
the employee (the agent) as a function of firm costs, i.e. fuel costs. V is highly related to y
since an employee’s job satisfaction is linked to the well-being of the firm itself. We assume
V is independent of treatment status, τ , because the marginal benefit and marginal cost to
the firm do not depend directly on treatment, but rather on the amount of fuel used (i.e.
for the same level of fuel but two different treatments, V is the same). Additionally, salaries
are fixed and donations to charity are paid by an outside donor.
We further define U(e, τ) to be the utility function under treatment τ with effort e and U¯
as a captain’s outside option.59 Let e˙ be the pre-study amount of effort and e¨ be the chosen
effort under τ . Note that the profit-maximizing principal (VAA) wants to design contracts
(treatments) that induce the optimal level of effort from the point of view of the principal.
In this case, the principal observes both the outcome (fuel usage) and the effort by the agent
but is restricted regarding contractual changes in terms of monetary compensation based on
effort levels of the fuel-efficient behaviors.
Therefore, the problem becomes:
max
e,g0
E[V (−f)]
s.t. E[U(w, s, e¨, fI , g, τ)] ≥ U¯
and e¨ ∈ argmax
e¨′
E[U(w, s, e¨′, fI , g, τ)]
The first-order condition is V ′(−f)
U ′(w,s,e¨,fI ,g,τ) = λ and so U
′(w, s, e¨, fI , g, τ) = λ · V ′(−f).
Captains choose the effort level that satisfies the marginal conditions.
Proposition 1. Captains in the control group will change their behavior if they are influenced
by social pressure. That is, they will generally increase effort if their effort level is below the
social effort level.
59Our notation differs slightly from the Hölmstrom (1979) since the cost of the action is embedded in the
utility function of the agent.
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Proof: We argued above that scrutiny due to the intervention is likely to (weakly) increase
either the probability of detection of a sub-optimal effort level (piobserved) or the perceived
level of socially optimal level of effort (esocial) or both. Both effects increase the social cost
component of the utility function for captains in all treatment cells, including the control
group. Put differently, for a given level of effort e¯ < esocial, the intervention increases the
marginal social cost of exerting low effort ∂U
∂s
|e¯. Consequently, captains respond to these
new marginal conditions and increase their effort if they are below the (perceived) socially
optimal level.60
Proposition 2. Information will cause captains to increase or decrease their effort and
thereby increase or decrease fuel usage respectively or choose the outside option, depending
on the realization of the difference between estimated (fit) and actual (f¯it) fuel usage (i.e.
the value of the parameter it).
Proof: Let the pre-study period be t = 0 and the study period be t = 1.
Assume in period t = 0, i0 < 0, then fi0 > f¯i0, so that when captains receive information
in t = 1, they learn that y2m(−f¯) > E[y2m(−f¯)]. In other words, they were more fuel-efficient
in t = 0 than they expected to be. Therefore, if they provide the same level of effort in period
t = 1, they will experience a level of utility greater than their pre-study equilibrium. They
pay the same cost of effort but receive more utility from job satisfaction. They will then
weakly decrease their chosen level of effort. How much depends on the functional form of
the y and c functions and their pre-study effort level. Captains in the information or targets
treatments—where wealth and the charities’ production functions are independent of effort—
will not decrease their effort if y is steeper than c around their chosen values. This scenario
is possible since there is a random shock of i0 to their location of −f¯ and we are agnostic
about the functional form of y. Without the shock, they would not be in equilibrium if y
were steeper with respect to effort than c at the chosen level of effort because they could
increase effort and pay a slightly higher cost but get much more utility from job satisfaction.
They will not choose their outside option since if
E[U(w, s, e˙, fI , g, τ = “pre-study, no treatment”)] ≥ U¯ ,
60Because of orthogonality to treatment, this simply increases baseline effort. Furthermore, because utility
is additively separable, qualitative findings from the subsequent comparative statics analysis are unchanged.
If there are interactions between social pressure and the treatments, these interactions just attenuate point
estimates because all treatments are designed to increase effort against a now greater baseline.
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then
E[U(w, s, e¨, fI , g, τ = “information”)] ≥ U¯ .
In other words, they can hold y constant and decrease effort and thereby increase U ,
while U¯ is held fixed.
Now assume i0 > 0, then fi0 < f¯i0 and so when captains receive information, they learn
that y2m(−f¯) < E[y2m(−f¯)], i.e. they were less fuel-efficient than expected. Therefore, if
they provide the same level of effort in period t = 1, they will receive below their pre-study
equilibrium amount of utility. They pay the same cost of effort but receive less utility from
job satisfaction. They will weakly increase their effort if the change in y is more than the
change in c, which depends on the functional form of these functions and their pre-study
effort level. They will not increase their effort if c is steeper than y for similar reasons
described in the previous case. They will choose their outside option if the change in y leads
to E[U(w, s, e¨, fI , g, τ = “information”)] < U¯ , which could occur if increases in effort lead to
larger increases in c than in y. Whether or not it occurs also depends on captains’ outside
option.
Finally, assume i0 = 0. Then captains are at their equilibrium with y2m(−f¯) = y2m(−fI)
and do not change their effort.
Proposition 3. Targets set above pre-study use will cause captains to weakly increase their
effort or choose their outside option.61
Proof: Since the target is set above pre-study use (i.e. captains are meeting the targets
fewer times than is optimal from the perspective of the firm), upon receiving a target, the
captains learn f > fT and get reference-dependent loss utility equal to y2n < 0. Therefore,
captains are strictly below their equilibrium in effort and strictly above in fuel usage since
in the pre-study period y2n = 0 from the assumption that fI = f¯ .
Captains will not increase their effort if the increased cost of effort is larger than the gain
from the associated decrease in fuel usage in the job satisfaction function. Captains will
increase their effort if the gain from the associated decrease in fuel usage is more than the
cost of effort. This depends on the functional form of these functions, the value of µ, and
the captains’ initial values during the pre-study period. Their chosen level of effort comes
from the first order condition with τ = “receive targets”.
61All targets were set above the pre-study attainment level, so this is the only case we consider.
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Since captains experience a negative utility shock from receiving a target, they will choose
the outside option if E[U(w, s, e¨, fI , g, τ = “receive targets”)] ≤ U¯ .
Proposition 4. Donations made to charity for meeting targets will weakly increase effort if
captains’ altruism is strictly positive and the donations do not affect their effort otherwise.
Proof: Let Vc(d(e), g) be the production function of the charity. Note that in the case of
pure altruism Vc = v1, as defined in the previous section. ∀d(e) · g ≥ 0, we have Vc > 0 and
Vc = 0 if and only if d(e) · g = 0. Then, captains solve the following optimization problem:
max
e,g0
E[V (−f) + a˜ · Vc]
s.t. E[U(w, s, e¨, fI , g, τ)] ≥ U¯
and e¨ ∈ argmax
e¨′
E[w, s, e¨′, fI , g, τ)]
with first-order condition V ′(−f)+a˜·V ′c
U ′(w,s,e¨,f,g,τ) = λ. If a captain has zero altruism, i.e. a˜ = 0, then
this equation reduces to the original and effort does not increase above the effect described
in Proposition 1. If a˜ > 0, then the numerator of the first-order condition is weakly larger
than the control case. It is strictly larger if d > 0. Captains with strictly positive altruism
may choose an effort level corresponding to d = 0 if the additional cost of increased effort
required for meeting the target is more than the gain in utility from donating to charity.
The probability of this occurring is decreasing in the level of altruism.
Since λ is a constant, increases in the sum of the production functions of the firm and
charity cause increases in effort, e˙ < e¨.
Proposition 5. Captains in the targets and prosocial conditions will choose to increase their
effort the most in tasks for which the targets are easiest to meet.
Proof: Since the firm sets the targets and donations exogenously62, the utility for meeting
a target is constant across tasks. The donation to charity is the same across tasks as ex-
ogenously determined, and since the targets are also exogenously determined, the captains
believe that the firm values them all equally by revealed preference. If the firm did not
value them equally, then it would not offer the same reward. However, the cost function is
not constant across tasks for reasons described earlier, which implies that the captains will
62Note that the “firm” here refers to both VAA and the academic researchers, who jointly made most
decisions with respect to experimental design.
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choose to increase their effort on tasks for which targets are easiest to meet.63 Within our
airline context, the least effortful behavior to attain is Efficient Taxi, followed by Fuel Load,
then Efficient Flight. The determination of this ordering is based on discussions with many
airline captains and trusted pilots groups.
63Our theory and interventions are rooted in Hölmstrom’s 1979 “Informativeness Principle”, which states
that any accessible information about an agent’s effort should be used in the design and enforcement of
optimal contracts. Our interventions are not aimed at the efficient allocation of effort across these tasks—as
proposed in Hölmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Baker (1992)—since we assume our three behaviors are
not substitutable (since they occur during different phases of flight). We acknowledge the possibility that
additional fuel-efficient behaviors exist that we do not measure that may be fully or partially neglected due
to our treatments.
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C Appendix III: Examples of Treatment Groups
Figure A1
Treatment Group 1: Information
 
 
We will continue to keep you updated on your monthly performance for the next X months, John. 
 
Please see reverse side for further details of the three behaviours.  
 
Questions?  We are here to help!  Please email us at project.uoc@fly.virgin.com. 
 
	  
 
 
 
Fuel and carbon efficiency report for Capt. John Smith 
 
Below is your monthly fuel and carbon efficiency report for Month 2014 
 
 
 
1. ZERO FUEL WEIGHT 
 
Proportion of flights for which 
the ZFW calculation was 
completed and fuel load 
adjusted as necessary 
 
RESULT: XX% of flights 
2. EFFICIENT FLIGHT 
 
Proportion of flights for which 
actual fuel use is less than 
planned fuel use (e.g. 
optimised speed, altitude etc) 
 
RESULT: XX% of flights 
3. REDUCED ENGINE TAXY IN 
 
Proportion of flights for which 
at least one engine was shut 
off during taxy in 
 
 
RESULT: XX% of flights 
All data gathered during this study will remain anonymous and confidential.  Safety remains the absolute 
and overriding priority.  This study will be carried out within Virgin’s existing and highly robust safety 
standards, using our existing fuel procedures and policies. Captains retain full authority, as they always 
have done in VAA, to make decisions based on their professional judgment and experience.	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Figure A2
Treatment Group 2: Targets
 
WHAT WAS YOUR OVERALL OUTCOME? 
 
You achieved X of your 3 targets last month. 
   
 WELL DONE! We will continue to keep you updated on your monthly performance  
for the next X months, John. 
 
Please continue to fly efficiently next month to achieve your targets. 
 
Please see reverse side for further details of the three behaviours.  
 
Questions?  We are here to help!  Please email us at project.uoc@fly.virgin.com. 
 
	  
 
 
 
Fuel and carbon efficiency report for Capt. John Smith 
 
Below is your monthly fuel and carbon efficiency report for Month 2014 
 
 
 
  
1. ZERO FUEL WEIGHT 
 
Proportion of flights for which 
the ZFW calculation was 
completed and fuel load 
adjusted as necessary 
 
TARGET: XX% of flights 
 
RESULT: XX% of flights 
 
You ACHIEVED/MISSED 
your target. 
2. EFFICIENT FLIGHT 
 
Proportion of flights for which 
actual fuel use is less than 
planned fuel use (e.g. 
optimised speed, altitude etc) 
 
TARGET: XX% of flights 
 
RESULT: XX% of flights 
 
You ACHIEVED/MISSED 
your target. 
3. REDUCED ENGINE TAXY IN 
 
Proportion of flights for which 
at least one engine was shut 
off during taxy in 
 
 
TARGET: XX% of flights 
 
RESULT: XX% of flights 
 
You ACHIEVED/MISSED 
your target. 
All data gathered during this study will remain anonymous and confidential.  Safety remains the absolute 
and overriding priority.  This study will be carried out within Virgin’s existing and highly robust safety 
standards, using our existing fuel procedures and policies. Captains retain full authority, as they always 
have done in VAA, to make decisions based on their professional judgment and experience.	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Figure A3
Treatment Group 3: Prosocial
 
WHAT WAS YOUR OVERALL OUTCOME? 
 
 Due to your fuel and carbon efficient decision making last month, 
you achieved X of your 3 targets and secured £XX of a possible £30 
 for your chosen charity, Charity Name. 
 
WELL DONE! For the next X months, you still have the ability to donate £X to Charity 
Name.  Please continue to fly efficiently next month to achieve your targets so your 
charity does not lose out. 
 
Please see reverse side for further details of the three behaviours.  
 
Questions?  We are here to help!  Please email us at project.uoc@fly.virgin.com. 
 
	  
 
 
Fuel and carbon efficiency report for Capt. John Smith  
 
Below is your monthly fuel and carbon efficiency report for Month 2014 
 
 
 
  
1. ZERO FUEL WEIGHT 
 
Proportion of flights for which 
the ZFW calculation was 
completed and fuel load 
adjusted as necessary 
 
TARGET: XX% of flights 
 
RESULT: XX% of flights 
 
You ACHIEVED/MISSED  
your target and 
earned/missed out on £10 
in donations to Charity 
Name. 
. 
2. EFFICIENT FLIGHT 
 
Proportion of flights for which 
actual fuel use is less than 
planned fuel use (e.g. 
optimised speed, altitude etc) 
 
TARGET: XX% of flights 
 
RESULT: XX% of flights 
 
You ACHIEVED/MISSED 
your target and 
earned/missed out on £10 
in donations to Charity 
Name. 
 
3. REDUCED ENGINE TAXY IN 
 
Proportion of flights for which 
at least one engine was shut 
off during taxy in 
 
 
TARGET: XX% of flights 
 
RESULT: XX% of flights 
 
You ACHIEVED/MISSED 
your target and 
earned/missed out on £10 
in donations to Charity 
Name. 
. 
All data gathered during this study will remain anonymous and confidential.  Safety remains the absolute 
and overriding priority.  This study will be carried out within Virgin’s existing and highly robust safety 
standards, using our existing fuel procedures and policies. Captains retain full authority, as they always 
have done in VAA, to make decisions based on their professional judgment and experience.	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Figure A4
All Treatment Groups: Reverse Side of Report
 
THE THREE BEHAVIOURS WE ARE MEASURING 
 
 
Behaviour 1: Zero Fuel Weight Adjustment (ZFW) - Pre Flight 
This measure compares Actual Ramp against Plan Ramp adjusted for changes in ZFW.  
It captures whether a double iteration adjustment has been implemented for ZFW in line 
with Plan Burn Adjustment and any further amendments to flight plan fuel that have 
been entered into ACARS. This behaviour has a tolerance of 200kg, which ensures that 
rounding in the fuel request / loading procedure will not adversely affect the result.   
 
 
Behaviour 2: Efficient Flight (EF) - During Flight 
This measure examines the actual fuel burn per minute compared against the expected 
fuel burn per minute from OFF to ON (expected fuel burn is Plan Trip adjusted for 
ZFW).  It highlights pilot technique (e.g. optimum settings are realised, optimum levels 
are sought, speed is optimised, etc.). 
 
 
Behaviour 3: Reduced Engine Taxy In (RETI) - Post Flight 
This measure observes if an engine has been shut down during taxy in. RETI is 
considered to have taken place if one engine burns less than 70% of the average of 
other engines during taxy in. If taxy in is shorter than the cool down period required, the 
flight is omitted, as RETI was not possible. 
 
We hope the above information is beneficial to you. If you require more information 
about any of the behaviours, please email us at project.uoc@fly.virgin.com. 
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D Appendix IV: Survey Materials
D.1 Prosocial Incentives
80
D.2 Job Satisfaction
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